联合国承认巴勒斯坦之法理分析

鉴于很多人对于巴勒斯坦合法性的疑问，笔者转载并翻译一篇权威分析文章供大家参考。

转载自 U.N. Recognition of a Palestinian State: A Legal Analysis

Original Artical: U.N. Recognition of a Palestinian State: A Legal Analysis

In order to address this question appropriately, it is first necessary to correct the common misconception that the United Nations established the State of Israel. On November 29, 1947, the U.N. General Assembly only approved the partition plan that would replace the British Mandate over the land of Israel. The decision of the U.N. General Assembly was binding in that case because of the special status of Palestine as a territory under British Mandate, a system which was intended to prepare nations for independence. This regime no longer applies to Palestine. Similarly, it is important to emphasize that the U.N. General Assembly did not "establish" the State of Israel in 1947. The General Assembly actually approved Israels full membership in the United Nations only in May 1949, almost a year after the Israeli Declaration of Independence. As a rule, the General Assembly of the UN cannot establish a state; rather, it can express its support for the establishment of a state and accept the state into its ranks (if the U.N. Security Council agrees), or it can call upon its member states to recognize the new state and to support its admission to the ranks of other international organizations.

想要更确切地阐释这个问题，首先我们需要澄清一个误区，即国联在1947年12月29日「建立」了以色列。联合国大会仅通过了关于将英统巴勒斯坦地区移交给以色列的地区划分规划。联合国大会的决议（被认为）与这件事相关（以色列建国）主要是因为巴勒斯坦在英统巴勒斯坦地区的特殊性，因为这块区域被用于准备建设独立国家。这项政策并不适用于巴勒斯坦。同样的，我们也需要强调一点，联合国大会并没有在1947年「建立」以色列国。大会实际上在1949年5月才通过了以色列的正式成员身份，将近在以色列独立的一年后。从规则上讲，联合国大会并不能建立一个国家；更应该说，联合国大会表达了它对建立一个国家的支持（如果联合国安理会同意的话），或者说，它（联合国大会）可以动议它的成员国来承认这个建立的国家（以色列）在国际组织上的地位。

When, then, is a political entity recognized as a state under international law? The classic definition of the existence of a state is found in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933. Article 1 of this Convention defines a "state" as a political entity that has the following four qualifications: a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The Convention also stipulated that the existence of a state is not dependent on the recognition of the state by other states. It thus appears that in this Convention, which reflects international custom, the opinion that the existence of a state is dependent upon its recognition by other states was rejected; recognition by other states is merely a statement of an established fact.

那么，在什么情况下一个政治实体才会被国际法承认为一个国家呢？对于这个问题，在1933年的《蒙特维多国家权利义务公约》是经典的解释。该公约的条款一中定义了作为「国家」的政治实体应该有以下四个标准：

有常住人口
有确定的领土
有政府
有能力与其他国家建立关系

同时《公约》还规定，国家的存在不依赖于其他国家对（待定）国家的承认。因此从这个公约的内容来看，它拒绝了「依赖其他国家承认才能确立国家存在」的观点，这也反映了国际上的惯例；其他国家的承认仅仅是一个既定事实的陈述。

According to the 1933 definition, U.N. recognition of the Palestinian state has no legal significance whatsoever; rather, the question of a States existence depends upon its meeting a series of conditions in reality. This is certainly the case with respect to the first three conditions set forth in the Convention: population, territory, and government. Regarding the last condition—the ability to conduct foreign relations—the accepted interpretation of this condition is that it was intended to prevent a situation in which units that are operating within the framework of a federal regime or that are subject to any kind of agreement that prevents them from conducting foreign relations, would be recognized as independent states. In other words, in this case as well, the question is one of fact. As Yoram Dinstein defines it so aptly in his book International Law and the State (Hebrew, 1971), the real question is: Is the political entity independent in its domestic policy, in making decisions regarding foreign affairs, and in its ability to function in the international arena?

根据1933年《公约》的定义，联合国对于「巴勒斯坦国」的承认没有任何法律效应；此外，对于一个国家是否成立的问题，我们更应考察其是否满足一系列的条件。《公约》的（条款一中的）前三个条件确实是：常主人口，领土和政府。然而考虑到最后一个条件——建立外交关系的能力——对于这个条件公认的解释是：防止一个单位在联邦制国家内独立运行的情况发生（译者注：因为联邦制国家内的城邦符合《公约》前三条的内容却不能认为是独立的国家）或者防止这个单位受到任何形式的妨碍他们进行对外关系的协议的约束（译者注：如受到制裁的国家，虽满足前三个条件，但与大多数其他国家不能建立正常外交关系，仍被认定为独立国家）。换言之，对于这个例子（以色列和巴勒斯坦的主权问题），问题就是事实。正如约兰·丁斯坦（Yoram Dinstein）在他的著作「国际法和国家」中所定义的那样，真正的问题是：这个政治实体是否在国内政策，外交决策以及在国际舞台上的作用方面独立？

The question of whether a Palestinian state exists, as a question of fact, is the subject of disagreement. On one hand, in the Gaza Strip, there is at least a regime that theoretically meets the conditions of the Montevideo Convention and appears to be essentially independent. As stated, the question of the lack of recognition of the regimes legitimacy by other states, is not relevant according to the Montevideo Convention. It is likely that the Palestinian Authority, at least in Area A (the areas in which the Palestinian Authority has full responsibility for internal security, public order, and civil affairs), also meets the aforementioned conditions of independence. Obviously, however, these two political entities—Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in Area A—are not declaring independence separately, mainly because the Palestinians are interested in international recognition of a "theoretical" third state that may not meet the criteria of the Montevideo Convention: a united and independent Palestinian state in all of the areas of Mandatory Palestine that Israel conquered in the Six Day War (i.e., the areas outside the 1967 borders), including East Jerusalem and the areas in which there are Jewish settlements. The existence of such a theoretical state is highly doubtful according to the definitions of the Montevideo Convention. The government in the area in question is divided between three political bodies that each claim the right to control it—Israel, Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, the body that is actually seeking recognition—the Palestinian Authority—is subject to the Oslo Accords, which explicitly stipulated that this body is not independent and that its actual control of the area and ability to enter into relations with other states are not absolute, but rather subject to various limitations. Furthermore, the issues of the location of the borders and the size of the population of the Palestinian state are at the center of a controversy that has been the subject of negotiations that have been conducted between Israel and the Palestinians for years. It is likely that if the Palestinians leave the definition of the borders unclear (as did the State of Israel at the time of its establishment), or if they reduce the area of their state to a minimum, their chances of meeting the definition would improve. However, the Palestinians are not interested in fragmented pieces of territory, with separate states on each piece, apparently because they fear that Israel will present those borders as final and fixed.

作为一个事实问题，是否存在「巴勒斯坦国」这个问题是分歧的主要矛盾。一方面，在加沙地带，至少有一个政治实体符合《公约》的条件，从而似乎基本上是独立的。如上所述，缺乏其他国家对其合法性的广泛认同与《公约》不相关。因此，至少在区域A（巴勒斯坦民族权力机构对该区域的内部安全、公众秩序和公民权利完全负责，译者注：区域A截至2013年指约旦河西岸13%的地区，系以色列公民禁止进入的区域），巴勒斯坦民族权力机构符合前面所提的国家独立的条件。然而，很显然的在加沙的「哈马斯」和在区域A的巴勒斯坦民族权力机构并没有各自宣布独立，主要是因为巴勒斯坦人想要国际承认一个事实上不符合《公约》的独立且统一的「第三国」：即在「六日战争」时以色列占领的所有的「巴勒斯坦地区」上的地区（如，1967年边界外的地区。译者注：国际上称之为「绿线」，即巴勒斯坦人想要宣布独立的地区是绿线外的地区，而这些地区并不符合《公约》的规定）。在这个问题中，这些区域的政府被分成了三个政治实体，他们分别都宣称对此地拥有控制权——以色列，哈马斯，巴勒斯坦民族权力机构。而事实上寻求国际认同的政治实体——巴勒斯坦民族权力机构——反对「奥斯陆协定」，该协定明确规定，这个政治实体不是独立的，它对地区的实际控制和与其他国家的关系的能力不是绝对的，而是受到各种限制。

此外，「巴勒斯坦国」的边界地点和人口规模问题是多年来以色列和巴勒斯坦人之间进行谈判的争议的中心。如果巴勒斯坦人模糊边界的定义（就像以色列成立时那样），或者如果他们把国家的面积减少到最低限度，他们很可能会达到《公约》定义的（独立建国）标准。但是，巴勒斯坦人对各自为政的领土不感兴趣，显然是因为他们担心以色列将这些边界作为最后和固定的边界。

This classic analysis, however, does not fully deal with the complexity of the subject of recognition of a state as it has developed in recent years: In the years since the signing of the Montevideo Convention, especially at the end of the colonial era, and even more so in recent years, the question of recognition has returned to the forefront of international discourse. On one hand, political entities that did not receive international recognition did not receive the status of states, even if they fulfilled the conditions of the Montevideo Convention. Examples of this are northern Cyprus, which is considered to be territory occupied by Turkey and is not recognized as an independent state, and Taiwan, which is still considered to be part of China. On the other hand, political entities that never met the conditions of the Montevideo Convention were recognized by the states of the world, and are considered to be states. This is the case, for example, with the Democratic Republic of Congo, which did not have an effective government at the end of Belgian colonial rule, or Bosnia, which was engaged in a civil war at the time of its establishment.

然而，这一经典分析并没有完全解决近年来「承认（国家合法性）」这个问题的复杂性：《公约》签署以来的，特别是在殖民地时代末期，近年来更是如此，「承认（国家合法性）」的问题重新回到了国际论坛的前沿。一方面，没有得到国际承认的政治实体即使符合《公约》的条件，也没有得到（合法）国家的地位。这方面的例子如北塞普勒斯，其被认为是土耳其占领的领土，不被认为是独立的国家；台湾（虽然符合《公约》所有标准）也被认为是中国的一部分。另一方面，从未满足《公约》条件的政治实体有的也得到了世界各国的承认，被认为是（合法）国家。例如，刚果民主共和国在比利时殖民统治结束时并没有一个有效的政府；或者是在成立时参与内战的波斯尼亚。

What, then, is the role of international recognition and how does it figure into the case of the Palestinian state?

那么，国际认同对「巴勒斯坦国」有什么作用？它又是如何影响这一事例的呢？

It seems that in recent years it is slowly becoming apparent that international recognition is especially important when there is doubt as to whether a political entity meets the conditions of the Montevideo Convention. In such a case, recognition by other states can resolve the doubt and attest to a states existence. A clear example of this process is the states that were established in the wake of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Croatia, for example, was not completely independent of Serbian rule at the time that it claimed independence. Recognition of Croatia by the states of the European Union, which was accompanied by a great number of conditions, contributed in actual fact to the consolidation of international recognition of an independent Croatia, resolving doubt or controversy regarding the existence of this state. Kosovo exists as an independent state due to the protection provided by a multinational force on its territory, a fact that casts doubt on whether Kosovo meets the criterion that requires effective control of the territory. Nonetheless, broad international recognition of Kosovos independence continues to grow.

近年来似乎慢慢显而易见的是，如果对一个政治实体是否符合「蒙得维的亚公约」的条件有疑问，国际承认就显得尤为重要。在这种情况下，其他国家的承认可以解决疑问，并证明一个国家的存在。这个过程的一个明显的例子是在前南斯拉夫解体之后建立的国家。例如，克罗埃西亚在宣称独立时并不完全独立于塞尔维亚统治。欧洲联盟各国对克罗埃西亚的承认，伴随著许多条件，实际上有助于巩固对独立的克罗埃西亚的国际承认，解决对这个国家存在的疑虑或争议。由于多国部队在其领土上提供的保护，科索沃作为一个独立的国家而存在，这一事实使人怀疑科索沃是否符合需要有效控制领土的标准。尽管如此，国际上对科索沃独立的广泛认可仍在继续。

From this discussion, it is apparent that in modern international law, when there is controversy regarding whether a political entity meets the factual conditions of statehood, international recognition of the state is significant. Such recognition cannot create a state ex nihilo, but it can tip the scales when facts are disputed. What is international recognition based upon? Certainly such recognition is based upon political considerations, but it also rests on the right of a nation to self-determination and the degree of the future states commitment to the principles of the international community. The length of time the political entity has existed is also important for the recognition of a state when there is controversy regarding its existence. Since the long term existence of a non-state political entity does not contribute to the stability of international rule, states tend to recognize entities that have been operating independently over time as states.

从这个讨论中可以看出，在现代国际法中，当一个政治实体是否符合国家的实际条件存在争议时，国家对国家的承认是有意义的。这种承认不能创造一个「无中生有」的国家，但是在事实有争议时，这种承认可能会达到规模。国际认可是基于什么？这样的承认当然是基于政治考虑的，但也取决于一个民族的自决权和未来国家对国际社会原则的承诺程度。政治实体存在的时间长短对于国家在存在争议时也是重要的。由于非国家政治实体的长期存在并不有助于国际统治的稳定，因此国家倾向于承认长期以来作为国家独立运作的实体。

Can an affirmative vote in the U.N. General Assembly reflect international recognition to the Palestinian state? As stated, a General Assembly vote does not, in and of itself, constitute a legal act of the U.N. which is binding upon member states, and the U.N. General Assembly does not have the authority to admit a state to the U.N. unless the U.N. Security Council (in which the United States has a veto) has recommended accepting the state. At most, the General Assembly can upgrade the status of the Palestinian representation to the level of an observer state, similar to the status of the Vatican, or can call upon other international organizations to accept the Palestinian state.

联合国大会的赞成票能否反映国际上对巴勒斯坦国的承认？如上所述，大会表决本身并不构成对成员国有约束力的联合国法律行为，联合国大会无权接受联合国的一个国家，除非联合国安理会（其中美国有否决权）建议接受国家。 大会最多可以将巴勒斯坦代表的地位提升到类似梵蒂冈地位的观察员国的地位，或者可以要求其他国际组织接受巴勒斯坦国。

Nonetheless, the vote of the U.N. General Assembly has a certain degree of legal significance: It can attest to the recognition of the Palestinian state by states of the world. As stated, in a case in which the existence of the state, as a matter of fact, is partial, and there is no consensus regarding it, such recognition may be significant. In my opinion, the necessary condition for such recognition to be significant is that it is general recognition; in other words, that there is an overwhelming majority in favor of recognition, which goes beyond "the automatic majority," and that there is so much recognition that is it possible to argue that (almost) all the countries in the world recognize the Palestinian entity as a state. Only in such a case can it be said that international recognition can move the discourse in international law from normative questions (e.g., should a Palestinian state be established and what should its territory be?) to positive questions (e.g., what are the rights of the existing Palestinian state and what should Israel do in response to the establishment of such a state?).

然而，联合国大会的表决具有一定的法律意义：它可以证明世界各国对巴勒斯坦国的承认。如上所述，在国家的存在是事实上是局部的，而对此没有共识的情况下，这种承认可能是重要的。在我看来，这种认可的重要性的必要条件是普遍承认，换句话说，绝大多数赞成承认是超越「自动多数」的承认，而且有这么多的认识，有可能认为世界上（几乎）所有的国家都承认巴勒斯坦人实体作为一个国家。只有在这种情况下，才能说国际承认可以将国际法中的话语从规范性问题（例如，如果一个巴勒斯坦国建立起来，它的领土应该是什么？）转到积极的问题上（例如，什么是现有的巴勒斯坦国以及以色列应该如何应对建立这样的国家？）。

Israels current policy, which is intended to garner opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state or at least lack of support for the establishment of such a state, seeks to achieve precisely this objective: The prevention of general international recognition of the present positive existence of the Palestinian state, and especially to prevent recognition of the 1967 borders as the permanent borders of the state. General international recognition of these borders is likely to put Israel in a very complex situation, since it would seemingly be controlling territories of that potential Palestinian state.

以色列目前的政策是为了反对建立一个巴勒斯坦国家，或者至少不支持建立这样的国家，力求实现这个目标：防止国际上普遍承认目前的存在的巴勒斯坦国，特别是防止国际承认1967年边界为（巴勒斯坦国）国家永久边界。国际上对这些边界的普遍承认可能使以色列处于一个非常复杂的局面，因为它似乎是控制这个潜在的巴勒斯坦国的领土。

From a strictly legal point of view, it is likely that the State of Israel will prevail in the current round: It is possible that general international recognition of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders will not receive the necessary majority, or that the U.N. decision will be vague enough to enable the State of Israel to regard it merely as a declaratory decision. But without real and significant negotiations, it is reasonable to assume that in the future, an international majority will be attained that will express general international recognition of the Palestinian position, even with respect to the issue of permanent borders—a situation that it is preferable for Israel to avoid.

从严格的法律角度来看，以色列国很可能在目前这一轮战胜：巴勒斯坦国在1967年边界内建国的普遍承认可能不会获得必要的多数赞同，或者联合国的决定将会含糊不清，使以色列只能把它看作一个宣示性决定。但是，如果没有真正的重大谈判，即使在永久边界问题上，也可以认为今后将获得国际上的多数认同，以表示对巴勒斯坦立场的普遍的国际承认，这种情况是以色列将要极力避免发生的。

这篇文章是一篇小心翼翼的「政治正确」论述文，但我们不妨理解和分析其中提到的一些要点。「国际认同」就是一个国家「合法建国」的标准吗？显然不是的，甚至联合国大会对于某些国家的「认同」都不具有法律效应。而《蒙特维多国家权利义务公约》中第一款第4条中关于「外交能力」的模糊阐述也让「国际认同」的法律效益存疑。

显然，如果我们从事实上出发，不难得出结论：巴勒斯坦人主张的，以1967年边境线为基础的「巴勒斯坦国」，即使在国际上看，也是不存在法律效力的。但是国际上对于未明确边界的「巴勒斯坦国」的普遍承认却有十分重大的国际影响力。国际认同对于「巴勒斯坦国」的影响力主要表现在对巴勒斯坦人独立建国的支持，并非承认哈马斯或者巴勒斯坦民族权力机构对于「巴勒斯坦国」的领土和边界的定义。

另外，目前的「国际认同」对于「巴勒斯坦国」的地位也仅是暂时的、阶段性的。然而目前这种「模糊的国际认同」对于巴勒斯坦建国是存在消极影响的，因为这种「国际认同」没有明确巴勒斯坦的边界和如何建国的问题。积极的「国际认同」应该推动以巴双方对于边界问题的定义，以及建国方式的确认。因此，这个问题的最终解决，需要依靠以色列和巴勒斯坦双方协商。