本公眾號已對多篇經典橋水(Bridgewater)研究文章做過翻譯工作。橋水對沖基金深度翻譯——An In-Depth Look at Deleveraging, (一)橋水對沖基金深度翻譯——An In-Depth Look at Deleveraging, (二)

橋水對沖基金深度翻譯——An In-Depth Look at Deleveraging, (二)

橋水對沖基金深度翻譯——An In-Depth Look at Deleveraging, (四)橋水對沖基金深度翻譯——An In-Depth Look at Deleveraging, (五)橋水對沖基金深度翻譯——An In-Depth Look at Deleveraging, (六)橋水對沖基金深度翻譯——An In-Depth Look at Deleveraging, (七)橋水對沖基金深度翻譯——An In-Depth Look at Deleveraging, (八)如何抓住大宗商品牛市!(原創獨家)橋水深度報告——一文通讀大宗商品和石油投資周期

上期文章鏈接請點擊:

橋水雄文——How the economic machine works 經濟機器是如何運作的(一)

橋水雄文——How the economic machine works 經濟機器是如何運作的(二)如有疏漏,煩請指正。此文章做交流分享之用,如有洗稿等類似行為,將委託維權騎士依法捍衛相關權利。雷達里奧(RayDalio)或許是這個星球最成功的資產管理經理(Asset manager) 他也同時樂於分享。在此篇雄文中,他系統地審述了他對宏觀經濟運行模式的理解,以及對於債務周期的敏銳觀察。我將儘力以我的專業知識提供儘可能客觀,準確的翻譯,和各位硬核金融愛好者們分享。如沒有時間閱讀如此深入的文章,可點擊以下鏈接收看時長為30分鐘的,由雷達里奧個人配音完成的《經濟機器是如何運行的》講解視頻。

以下為翻譯第三部分:1)Productivity Growth

生產力增長

As shown below in chart 1, real per capita GDP has increased at an average rate of a shade less than 2% over the last 100 years and didn』t vary a lot from that. This is because, over time, knowledge increases, which in turn raises productivity and living standards. As shown in this chart, over the very long run, there is relatively little variation from the trend line. Even the Great Depression in the 1930s looks rather small. As a result, we can be relatively confident that, with time, the economy will get back on track. However, up close, these variations from trend can be enormous. For example, typically in depressions the peak-to-trough declines in real economic activity are around 20%, the destruction of financial wealth is typically more than 50% and equity prices typically decline by around 80%. The losses in financial wealth for those who have it at the beginning of depressions are typically greater than these numbers suggest because there is also a tremendous shifting of who has wealth. 如圖1所示,人均國內生產總值在過去100年里的增速在略低於2%的平均值左右。並且沒有太大的變化。而這是由於,在這段時間裡,知識水平顯著地提高,並且提升了人類社會的生產力以及生活水平,如圖所示,在很長的周期,從趨勢線來說只有少量的區別。即使在1930年的大蕭條中,這樣的差別也是相對小的,因此,我們可以較為自信地說,在一段時間裡,經濟將回到正軌上。然而,從趨勢上說,這樣的差別有可能是巨大的,舉例來說,通常在大蕭條里,現實經濟行為在經濟峰谷里下調的範圍在20%之間,而這通常來說將毀滅一半以上的金融財富,同時權益資產的價格通常將在80%的比率下跌。在蕭條開始時,富人比數據上承受更大的損失,而這是由於財富從富人轉移出來的緣故。

Swings around this trend are not primarily due to expansions and contractions in knowledge. For example, the Great Depression didnt occur because people forgot how to efficiently produce, and it wasnt set off by war or drought. All the elements that make the economy buzz were there, yet it stagnated. So why didnt the idle factories simply hire the unemployed to utilize the abundant resources in order to produce prosperity? These cycles are not due to events beyond our control, e.g., natural disasters. They are due to human nature and the way the credit system works. 趨勢間顯著的波動和變化的原因並不主要是由於只是水平的增長或是減少。比如說,大蕭條的發生並不是由於人民忘了如何高效的生產,同時也不是由饑荒或是戰爭所引發的。所有的使經濟繁亂的因素都存在,然而經濟卻停滯不前,那麼為何空閑的工廠並不去簡單地通過僱傭那些失業的人口以提高對閑置資源的利用以創造更多的財富?這些經濟周期的誕生並不是因為事件本身超乎我們的掌控。例如,自然災害。這些泡沫破碎的原因在於人類的本性以及金融信用系統本身的機制。Most importantly, major swings around the trend are due to expansions and contractions in credit – i.e., credit cycles, most importantly 1) a long-term (typically 50 to 75 years) debt cycle2) a shorter-term (typically 5 to 8 years) debt cycle (i.e., the 「business/market cycle」). Productivity is examined in greater depth in chapter III, 「Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing Countries Succeed.」

尤為重要的是,主要趨勢的變動是由於信用的擴張以及緊縮,例如,信貸周期。其中有以下幾個重點 1)長期(通常在50~75年)的債務周期 2)更短的(通常在5~8年)的債務周期,比如說商業/市場周期)有關生產力將在第三章進行更深入的檢驗以及探索。「生產力和結構改革:為何國家經濟體成功/失敗,以及失意國家應當如何行動以奮起直追」The Two Debt Cycles 兩個債務周期I find that whenever I start talking about cycles, particularly the long-term variety, I raise eyebrows and elicit reactions similar to those I』d expect if I were talking about astrology. For this reason, before I begin explaining these two debt cycles Id like to say a few things about cycles in general. 我發現只要我一提及有關於周期,尤其是長期周期,我就引起了各方的眼球,就像是我在討論玄學一樣。出於這個原因,在我開始解釋關於這兩個債務周期時,我想大概地談下周期。A cycle is nothing more than a logical sequence of events leading to a repetitious pattern. In a market-based economy, cycles of expansions in credit and contractions in credit drive economic cycles and they occur for perfectly logical reasons. Each sequence is not pre-destined to repeat in exactly the same way nor to take exactly the same amount of time, though the patterns are similar, for logical reasons. For example, if you understand the game of Monopoly?, you can pretty well understand credit and economic cycles. Early in the game of Monopoly?, people have a lot of cash and few hotels, and it pays to convert cash into hotels. Those who have more hotels make more money. Seeing this, people tend to convert as much cash as possible into property in order to profit from making other players give them cash. So as the game progresses, more hotels are acquired, which creates more need for cash (to pay the bills of landing on someone else』s property with lots of hotels on it) at the same time as many folks have run down their cash to buy hotels. When they are caught needing cash, they are forced to sell their hotels at discounted prices. So early in the game, 「property is king」 and later in the game, 「cash is king.」 Those who are best at playing the game understand how to hold the right mix of property and cash, as this right mix changes.

周期本身僅僅是事物必然的,遵照邏輯形成的一系列事件,並最終形成相似的規律。在一個以市場為基準的經濟體里,信用擴張和收縮驅動著經濟周期,同時他們形成的原因是絕對嚴謹的。每個事件發生的順序並非是既定好的方式,必然重複的,並且發生的時間段也不盡然相同。然而出於邏輯性的因素,它們演變的形式極為類似。例如,如果你知道大富翁遊戲的規則,那麼你就能夠明白信用擴張和收縮的過程,在早期的大富翁遊戲里,人們有大量的現金和些許的酒店,然而將現金轉化為酒店需要支付費用。然而擁有更多酒店的,總是獲得更多現金,在目睹這樣的現象後,人們總是想要將儘可能多的現金換成固定資產以求讓其他玩家支付現金給他們。隨著遊戲的發展,更多的酒店被購買了,然而這卻創造了現金的需求(由於玩家在他人多酒店駐地上需要支付買路費)與此同時許多玩家早已將現金轉換成了酒店,當他們急需現金時,他們往往折價賣掉所有的固定資產。因此在遊戲的早期,「固定資產為王」,在遊戲的後期,「現金為王」。最優秀的玩家知道如何平衡地配比兩者之間的比重,以及隨著形勢變化,配比的改變。

Now, let』s imagine how this Monopoly? game would work if we changed the role of the bank so that it could make loans and take deposits. Players would then be able to borrow money to buy hotels and, rather than holding their cash idly, they would deposit it at the bank to earn interest, which would provide the bank with more money to lend. Let』s also imagine that players in this game could buy and sell properties from each other giving each other credit (i.e., promises to give money and at a later date). If Monopoly? were played this way, it would provide an almost perfect model for the way our economy operates. There would be more spending on hotels (that would be financed with promises to deliver money at a later date). The amount owed would quickly grow to multiples of the amount of money in existence, hotel prices would be higher, and the cash shortage for the debtors who hold hotels would become greater down the road. So, the cycles would become more pronounced. 現在讓我們想像這個大富翁遊戲在我們改變了銀行的角色,使其能夠房貸,同時允許銀行存款,繼續遊玩此遊戲。由此玩家得以借款來購買酒店同時不僅僅是單純握有現金,他們得以放入銀行吃息。而這將導致銀行有更多現金可供貸出。讓我們想像這個遊戲里,玩家可以向彼此間購買和銷售固定資產,並且支付信貸(舉例來說,允諾未來支付此筆款項)。如果大富翁以這種方式運行,這將展現一個經濟完美的運作方式。那麼將有更多的款項被用於支付酒店(這些酒店的款項都是被允許在未來支付的)。欠款將以更快的速度積累,酒店價格將由於此抬升,而對於擁有酒店的債務人得現金將進一步吃緊。因此這將進一步強化此周期。The bank and those who saved by depositing their money in it would also get into trouble when the inability to come up with needed cash caused withdrawals from the bank at the same time as debtors couldn』t come up with cash to pay the bank. Basically, economic and credit cycles work this way. 銀行以及那些持有銀行存款的人同時也會遭遇到麻煩,因為不穩定性開始浮現,現金需求愈發緊張,大量的從銀行取現的行為伴隨著存款行為的減少。基本上說,經濟和信貸周期以這種方式運行的。We are now going to look at how credit cycles – both long-term debt cycles and short-term debt cycles – drive economic cycles. But first we need to understand some basics of how money and credit work in a market-based system. 我們現在將看看信用周期是如何運作的,長期債務周期以及短期債務周期,是如何驅動經濟周期的,但首先我們必須先了解貨幣和信貸是如何在市場基準系統下運行的基礎知識。Money and Credit in a Market-Based System 市場基準系統下的貨幣和信用Prosperity exists when the economy is operating at a high level of capacity: in other words, when demand is pressing up against a pre-existing level of capacity. At such times, business profits are good and unemployment is low. The longer these conditions persist, the more capacity will be increased, typically financed by credit growth. Declining demand creates a condition of low capacity utilization; as a result, business profits are bad and unemployment is high. The longer these conditions exist, the more cost-cutting (i.e., restructuring) will occur, typically including debt and equity write-downs. Therefore, prosperity equals high demand, and in our creditbased economy, strong demand equals strong real credit growth; conversely, deleveraging equals low demand, and hence lower and falling real credit growth. Contrary to now-popular thinking, recessions and depressions do not develop because of productivity (i.e., inabilities to produce efficiently); they develop from declines in demand, typically due to a fall-off in credit creation.

當經濟以大規模的方式運作著,這孕育出了繁榮。換而言之,即當需求擠壓著先前的規模水平時,這是繁榮的先決條件。在這種時段里,商業利潤良好,失業率保持在低位,這樣的趨勢保持越久,經濟的規模就越龐大。這樣的經濟規模是由信用增速維持的。需求銳減將導致更低規模,更低效率的經濟運作,其結果是,商業利潤惡化,失業率激增。這樣的情形存在越久,成本削減行為(重組)就會愈演愈烈。通常來說這包含了債務以及股本減記。因此,繁榮源於高需求,而在我們信用本位的經濟來說,強勁的需求等於強勁的實際信用增長,相對的,去槓桿對應著低需求,因此這將是實際信用增速下降。和絕大部分參與者想法相左的是,衰退和蕭條並不由於生產力的因素決定(無法高效生產的能力)衰退和蕭條在市場總體需求惡化的時候形成,往往是由信貸增速的銳減產生的。Since changes in demand precede changes in capacity in determining the direction of the economy, one would think that prosperity would be easy to achieve simply through pursuing policies that would steadily increase demand. When the economy is plagued by low capacity utilization, depressed business profitability and high unemployment, why doesnt the government simply give it a good shot of whatever it takes to stimulate demand in order to produce a far more pleasant environment of high capacity utilization, fat profits and low unemployment? The answer has to do with what that shot consists of. 當需求端的變化對經濟趨勢的影響領先其資本規模的變化,有些人會認為繁榮會是容易通過政策刺激需求達成的。當經濟受到低資本規模,受到抑制的商業盈利以及高居不下的失業率鉗制時,為什麼政府不簡單地通過不計一切代價的方式刺激需求同時為更高規模的資本環境提供更好的環境呢,讓企業享受豐厚的利潤和強制性的就業或許可以達到目標?關於這個問題的解答要回到這個政策的使用本身。Money 金錢/貨幣Money is what you settle your payments with. Some people mistakenly believe that money is whatever will buy you goods and services, whether thats dollar bills or simply a promise to pay (e.g., whether its a credit card or an account at the local grocery). When a department store gives you merchandise in return for your signature on a credit card form, is that signature money? No, because you did not settle the transaction. Rather, you promised to pay money. So you created credit, which is a promise to pay money. 金錢/貨幣是你用來支付的手段,有些人誤解了為只要能夠購買到商品和服務的就是錢/貨幣,不論它是美元還是僅僅是一個承諾支付的憑證(舉例來說信用卡和本地雜貨鋪的會員賬戶)當一個賣場商店通過你的簽名或是信用卡憑證提供給你商品,那麼這些是附帶簽名的貨幣嗎,並不是,這是由於你並未結算這些交易,這其實是等同於你承諾在未來支付這筆款項。因此當你創造了信用,其本質就是承諾在未來兌付這筆款項。

The Federal Reserve has chosen to define 「money」 in terms of aggregates (i.e., currency plus various forms of credit - M1, M2, etc.), but this is misleading. Virtually all of what they call money is credit (i.e., promises to deliver money) rather than money itself. The total amount of debt in the U.S. is about $50 trillion and the total amount of money (i.e., currency and reserves) in existence is about $3 trillion. So, if we were to use these numbers as a guide, the amount of promises to deliver money (i.e., debt) is roughly 15 times the amount of money there is to deliver.5 The main point is that most people buy things with credit and don』t pay much attention to what they are promising to deliver and where they are going to get it from, so there is much less money than obligations to deliver it.

美聯儲選擇通過定義「貨幣「為一種集合的概念(比如說貨幣加上不同形式的信用M1,M2等)然而這種概念本身具有誤導性。基本上他們所稱之為貨幣的都是信用(舉例來說,承諾支付報酬)而不是貨幣本身。美國如今的總債務在50萬億然而貨幣的總額(貨幣以及儲備)事實上以實體存在的僅有3萬億美元。因此如果我們以這些數字作為指標,這些承諾支付貨幣(或是債務)的總額是約15倍於我們提供的現金。重點是絕大多數人通過信用購買商品,而他們本身並不會在自身將要在未來支付什麼,以什麼方式支付,或是這部分款項從何而來有過多關注,因此對比於這些應付義務來說,我們僅有更少的金錢支撐著這套系統。Credit 信用/信貸As mentioned, credit is the promise to deliver money, and credit spends just like money. While credit and money spend just as easily, when you pay with money the transaction is settled; but if you pay with credit, the payment has yet to be made. 如前文所示,信用/信貸是一個兌付款項的承諾,而信用可以如同金錢一樣用以支付。當你如期付款完成這筆交易,信用和金錢變得同樣容易被用於支付。當你使用信用支付時,其本質是,此款項尚未結清。There are two ways demand can increase: with credit or without it. Of course, its far easier to stimulate demand with credit than without it. For example, in an economy in which there is no credit, if I want to buy a good or service I would have to exchange it for a comparably valued good or service of my own. Therefore, the only way I can increase what I own and the economy as a whole can grow is through increased production. As a result, in an economy without credit, the growth in demand is constrained by the growth in production. This tends to reduce the occurrence of boom-bust cycles, but it also reduces both the efficiency that leads to high prosperity and severe deleveraging, i.e., it tends to produce lower swings around the productivity growth trend line of about 2%. 有兩種方式提振需求:通過信貸或是不選用信貸。理所當然的是,通過信用提振需求將遠遠好於不通過信用提振需求。舉例來說,在一個沒有任何信貸的經濟體內,如果我想要購買某個商品或是服務,我應當選取某個對比來說,價值相當的商品或是服務去進行兌換。因此,唯一能夠使我提高需求或是經濟作為一個整體,也僅僅能夠通過提升產量來擴張。其結果是,在沒有信貸系統的經濟體離,需求端的增長受到來自於生產力的束縛。這樣的趨勢將減少繁榮-泡沫破碎這一循環的頻繁度。但是這同時減少了市場行為的有效性,也阻止了通往高繁榮以及極端的去槓桿行為的道路。例如,這樣的經濟體在其生產力增長趨勢線上僅有約為2%的變幅。

By contrast, in an economy in which credit is readily available, I can acquire goods and services without giving up any of my own. A bank will lend the money on my pledge to repay, secured by my existing assets and future earnings. For these reasons credit and spending can grow faster than money and income. Since that sounds counterintuitive, let me give an example of how that can work.

對比來說,在一個樂於接受信用作為支付手段的經濟體里,我不需要犧牲任何所有的利益便可以獲得商品和服務。銀行同時能夠憑藉我將支付未來款項的許諾去貸款,而這是受到我現有財產和未來預期收入所擔保的。出於以上原因,信用和消費會比貨幣以及收入以更快的速度攀升。雖然這有悖於我們直覺所認知的,我將提供更詳細的案例以解釋此運作原理。If I ask you to paint my office with an agreement that I will give you the money in a few months, your painting my office will add to your income (because you were paid with credit), so it will add to GDP, and it will add to your net worth (because my promise to pay is considered as much of an asset as the cash that I still owe you). Our transaction will also add an asset (i.e., the capital improvement in my office) and a liability (the debt I still owe you) to my balance sheet. Now let』s say that buoyed by this increased amount of business that I gave you and your improved financial condition that you want to expand. So you go to your banker who sees your increased income and net worth, so he is delighted to lend you some 「money」 (increasing his sales and his balance sheet) 如果我僱傭你並讓你為我的辦公室漆刷牆面,同時我們約定我將在數個月里支付你該款項,你的這筆漆刷收入將被加入到你的收入(由於你收到的是信用)而這筆交易將被計入國民生產總值GDP以及會加入到你的個人凈值(由於我的兌付承諾將被認為現金資產,作為我個人欠你的)我們的交易同時會計入一筆資產(舉例來說,我辦公室資本價值的提升)以及增加了一筆債務(我仍欠你的一筆款項)並加入到我的負債平衡表內。)現在我們假定由於我公司資產負債表的擴張,我的生意規模增加了,我支付了你的報酬,而你的財務狀況有好轉因此你決定擴張生意。因此你找到你的銀行家,他看到你的凈值和收入都有所提升,因此他更愉悅地想要貸給你更多的金錢(銷售規模和財報擴張)5 As a substantial amount of dollar-denominated debt exists outside the U.S., the total amount of claims on dollars is greater than this characterization indicates, so it is provided solely for illustrative purposes. that you decide to buy a financial asset with (let』s say stocks) until you want to spend it. As you can see, debt, spending and investment would have increased relative to money and income.

因此你決定持有併購買金融資產(我們假定股票)直到你想要消費掉該款項為止。如你所見,債務,消費和投資將相對於金錢和收入的增加而增長。This process can be, and generally is, self-reinforcing because rising spending generates rising incomes and rising net worths, which raise borrowers』 capacity to borrow, which allows more buying and spending, etc. Typically, monetary expansions are used to support credit expansions because more money in the system makes it easier for debtors to pay off their loans (with money of less value), and it makes the assets I acquired worth more because there is more money around to bid them. As a result, monetary expansions improve credit ratings and increase collateral values, making it that much easier to borrow and buy more. 這樣的過程有可能是,或者普遍是,一個自我強化的過程,由於消費增長帶動了收入以及凈值的增長。而這使借方得以借貸的規模擴大,而借貸行為又促進了更多的購買和消費。通常來說,貨幣性的擴張用以支撐信貸擴張,這是由於更多系統里的現金允許債務人更容易償還他們的債務(其手中持有的貨幣貶值)而這使得我所持有的資產獲得了更高的價值,這是由於有更多的現金被用以交易這類資產。其結果是,貨幣性的擴張提升了信用情況,並且提升了抵押物的價值。這使得參與者得以更容易地通過借貸來購買更多的這類資產。In such an economy, demand is constrained only by the willingness of creditors and debtors to extend and receive credit. When credit is easy and cheap, borrowing and spending will occur; and when it is scarce and expensive, borrowing and spending will be less. In the short-term debt cycle, the central bank will control the supply of money and influence the amount of credit that the private sector creates by influencing the cost of credit (i.e., interest rates). Changes in private sector credit drive the cycle. Over the long term, typically decades, debt burdens rise. This obviously cannot continue forever. When it can』t continue a deleveraging occurs. 在這樣的經濟體里,需求僅僅被信用方以及債務方的意願限制住,因他們有能力擴張或是接受信用。當信用是便宜以及易於獲得的,借款和支付行為將會出現,當信貸變得稀缺以及昂貴,借貸行為以及消費行為就會大量減少,惡化。在短期債務周期李,中央銀行得以通過影響信用的成本(基準利率)以控制貨幣公益去影響私人部門的信用規模。私人部門的信用變化將驅動著周期。在長期來說,通常在一段時間裡,債務壓力驟增。這樣的過程自然不可能永遠持續,當這樣的過程無法持續,去槓桿行為將更多的形成。As previously mentioned, the most fundamental requirement for private sector credit creation to occur in a market-based system is that both borrowers and lenders believe that the deal is good for them. Since one man』s debts are another man』s assets, lenders have to believe that they will get paid back an amount of money that is greater than inflation (i.e., more than they could get by storing their wealth in inflation-hedge assets), net of taxes. And, because debtors have to pledge their assets (i.e., equity) as collateral in order to motivate the lenders, they have to be at least as confident in their ability to pay their debts as they value the assets (i.e., equity) that they pledged as collateral. 如前文所言,私營部門在市場基準經濟系統里的信用創造的最基本的要素是借貸雙方認為交易將有利於雙方。然而一個人的債務就是另一個人的資產,貸方相信他們的款項將在未來被支付,並以比通脹更高的價格所支付(舉例來說,這樣的比例是比他們將財產儲放在通脹-對沖性資產更多的)稅務的凈額以及,由於債務人以自身的財產(或是權益)作為抵押物,以激勵貸方貸款,他們理應至少有足夠信心有能力以他們作為抵押物的,起碼具備自身資產價值做償付。Also, an important consideration of investors is liquidity – i.e., the ability to sell their investments for money and use that money to buy goods and services. For example, if I own a $100,000 Treasury bond, I probably presume that Ill be able to exchange it for $100,000 in cash and in turn exchange the cash for $100,000 worth of goods and services. However, since the ratio of financial assets to money is so high, obviously if a large number of people tried to convert their financial assets into money and buy goods and services at the same time, the central bank would have to either produce a lot more money (risking a monetary inflation) and/or allow a lot of defaults (causing a deflationary deleveraging). 同時,投資者一個首要的考量是流動性,比如說,他們通過銷售掉自身投資以獲得現金並通過其支付商品和服務的能力。舉例來說如果我擁有價值為10萬美金的商品和服務,我或許會假定我有能力獲得10萬美金的現金,或是購買到等值的商品和現金。無論如何,由於金融資產比現金的比例過高,顯然如果有一大批人想通過將他們的金融資產轉換為現金並且同時以其購買商品和服務。中央銀行要麼印製更多的現金(冒著惡性通脹的危險)或者是去容許更多的違約(將導致緊縮性去槓桿)。

weixin.qq.com/r/8jr64tf (二維碼自動識別)


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