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>字幕：七印部落Steve Jobs: The lost interview史蒂夫 喬布斯：遺失的訪談I"m Bob Cringley, 16 years ago when I was making my television series Triumph of the Nerds, I interviewed Steve Jobs. That was in 1995, 10 years earlier Steve had left Apple, following a bruising struggle with John Sculley, the CEO he had brought into the company. At the time of our interview, Steve was running NeXT, the niche computer company he founded after leaving Apple. Little bit we know was within 18 months he would sell NeXT to Apple, and 6 month later he"d be running the place. 我是Bob Cringley，16年前（1995）我製作《書獃子的勝利》時採訪了喬布斯。1985年，喬布斯被他自己引薦的CEO John Sculley排擠出蘋果。接受釆訪時，喬布斯正在經營他創辦的NeXT公司，18個月後蘋果收購NeXT，半年後喬布斯重新掌管蘋果。The way things work in television we use only a part of that interview in the series. And for years we thought the interview was lost for forever because the master tape were missing while being shipped from London to US in the 1990s. Then just a few days ago, series director Paul Sen found a VHS copy of that interview in hisgarage. 當年的節目只用了一小段採訪，九十年代末採訪母帶從倫敦運往美國途中遺失，多年來我們一直以為再也看不到完整的採訪，然而幾天前導演Paul Sen在車庫裡發現了一份VHS拷貝。There are very few TV interviews with Steve Jobs and almost no good ones. They rarely show thecharisma,candor and vision that this interview does. And so to honor an amazing man, here"s that interview in its entirety. Most of these has never been seen before. 喬布斯生前很少接受電視採訪，如此精彩的訪談更是罕見。它記錄了喬布斯的坦率，非凡的魅力和獨特的視野。為了向這位奇人致敬，我們幾乎一刀未剪，大部分內容是首次公佈於眾。So, how did you get involved, uh, with personal computers? 你是怎麼與個人計算機結緣的？Well, I ran into my first computer when I was about 10 or 11. And it』s hard to remember back then but I』m, I』m no fossile now, I』m nofossile …So when I was 10 or 11, that was about 30 years ago and no one had ever seen a computer. To the extent they』d seen them, they』d seen them in the movies.我第一次見到計算機是10或11歲。很難回憶當年的情景，我可不是故作老成……大約30多年前，見過電腦的人不多，即使見到，也是在電影裏。And they were really big boxes with...For some reason they fixated it on the tape drives, as being the icon of what the computer was, or flashing light somehow. And, so nobody had ever seen mysterious, very powerful things that did something in the background. And so to see one and actually get to use one was a realprivilege back.那時電影裏的計算機都是裝有開盤機的大櫃子，閃閃發光。真正瞭解計算機功能和原理的人不多，有機會接觸計算機的人更是寥寥無幾。And I got into NASA Ames Research Center and I got to use a time sharing terminal. And so I didn』t actually see a computer but I saw a time sharingterminal. And in those days it』s hard to remember how primitive it was. There were no such things as a computer with a graphics video display. It was literally a printer. It was a teletype printer with keyboard on it. 我有幸在NASA Ames研究中心見到一臺，那還不是一臺完整的計算機，只是一臺分時共享的終端機。設備非常簡陋，連顯示器都沒有。只是一臺帶鍵盤的電傳印表機。So you would keyboard this commands in and you would wait for a while, and then things would go "tatatatatata", and it would tell you something else.But even with that, it was still remarkable, especially for a 10-year-old, that you could write a program in BASIC, let"s say, or FORTRAN.你在鍵盤上輸入指令耐心等待，然後它會噠噠噠地輸出結果。即便如此這玩意也太奇妙了，尤其是對十歲的男孩而言。你可以用Basic語言或Fortran語言編寫程序。And actually this machine would sort of take your idea, and it would sort of execute your idea and give you back some results. And if they were the results youpredicted, your program really work, and it was incredibly thrilling experience. So I became very err.... captivated by computer.機器接受並執行你的設想，然後把結果告訴你。如果結果和設想的一樣，說明程序見效了，這太讓人激動了。我完全給計算機迷住了。And a computer to me was still a little mysterious cause it"s at the other end of wire,I had never really seen the actual computer itself. I think I got towards computers after that, saw the inside, and then I was part of this school byHewlett-Packard.當然計算機對我而言仍然有些神祕，因為真正的計算機藏在電纜的另一端，而我從未見過。打那以後我總想著計算機，後來我在惠普附近的學校讀書。When I was 12, I called up Bill Hewlett who lived in Hewlett-Packard at the time. And again it dazed me...But there was no such thing as unlistedtelephone number then, so I can just look into the book and look his name up.12歲時我打電話給Bill Hewlett，他當時住在惠普。又是一次奇妙的經歷，當時所有的電話號碼都印在號碼簿裏，只要翻電話號碼簿，就能查到他的電話。And he answered the phone, and I saidHi, My name is Steve Jobs. You don"t know me, but I"m 12 years old, and I"m building a frequency counter, and I"d like some spare parts. And so he talked to me for about 20 minutes, I will never forget as long as I live, he gave me the parts, but he also gave me a job working in Hewlett-Packard that summer. And I was 12 years old, and that really made a remarkable influence on me.他接了電話，我說我叫Steve Jobs，你不認識我，我12歲，打算做頻率計數器，需要些零件。我們聊了大概20分鐘。我永遠記得他不但給了零件，還邀請我夏天去惠普打工。我才12歲，這件事對我產生了不可思議的影響。Hewlett-Packardwas really the only company I"d ever seen in my life at that age. And it forms my view of what a company was and how well they treated their employees.惠普是我見過的第一家公司，它讓我懂得了什麼是公司，如何善待員工。You know, at that time, I mean they didn"t know aboutcholesterol back then. And then at that time they used to bring a big car full of donuts and coffee out at 10 o"clock every morning, and everyone take a coffee and have a donut break, just little things like that.It was clear that the company recognized its true values was its employees.那時還沒有膽固醇偏高一說。每天上午十點公司拖來滿滿一卡車的甜面圈和咖啡，大家停下工作喝杯咖啡，品嘗甜面圈。很明顯惠普明白公司真正的價值在於員工。So anyway, since with HP and I started going up to their Palo Alto Research Labs every Tuesday night, with a small group of people to meet some of the researchers and staffs. And I saw the first desktop computer ever made which was the HP 1900.之後我每週二晚都去惠普的Palo Alto實驗室，與一些研究人員見面。我見到了第一臺臺式計算機HP 1900。It was that as big as a suitcase but it actually had a small Cathode Ray Tube(CRT) displayed in it. And it was completed self-contained. There was no wire going off behind the curtain somewhere, and I fell in love with it. And you could program BASIC in APL. And I would just, for hours, you know, get right up to HP and just hang around that machine and write programs for it.大概有行李箱那麼大，裝著小小的CRT顯示器，它是一臺可以獨立工作的一體機，我很喜歡。它使用Basic或APL編程，我常常數小時地守著它編程。So that was the early days. And I met Steve Wozniak around that time too, maybe a little earlier, when I was about 14, 15 years old. And we immediately hit it off, and he was the first person I met who knew moreelectronics than I did. So I like him a lot and he was, uh, maybe 5 years older than I.那是早些年，也差不多也是在那時我認識了Steve Wozniak。我大約十四五歲，可能還要小些。我倆很投緣，他是我遇到的第一個比我更懂電子知識的人。他大概比我大五歲，我很喜歡他。He gone off to college and got kicked out for pulling pranks. And he was living with his parents and going to the ends of the local junior college. so we became best friends and started doing projects together. We read about the story in Esquire magazine about this guy named Captain Crunch, who couldsupposedly make free telephone calls, you heard about this I"m sure.他因為製造惡作劇被大學開除。剛剛回到父母家，正在修大專的結業課程。我們成了最要好的朋友，開始一起做項目。我們在《Esquire》雜誌上看到有個叫Captain Crunch的人。據說他有辦法打免費電話，你肯定也聽說過。And we again, we were captivated. How could anybody do this? And we thought it must be a hoax. And we started looking through libraries, looking for the secret tones that would allow you to do this. And it turned out that we were at Stanford Linear Accelerate Center one night, and way in vaults of their technical library, way down at the last bookshelf in the corner bottom rack.We found an AT&T Technical Journal that laid out the whole thing.我們很好奇，怎麼可能做到呢？多半是吹牛。我們開始泡圖書館，尋找打免費電話的祕密。一天晚上我們去了斯坦福線性加速中心，在科技圖書館角落的最後一排書架上，我們找到一份AT&T技術手冊，揭開了所有的祕密。And that"s another moment I"ll never forget. We saw this journal and we thought "My God! It"s all real." And so we set out to build a device to make these tones. And the way it work was, you know when you make long distance call you used to hear "dududududu" right in the background. They were tones that sound like the touch tone you make on your phone, but with different frequencies so you can make them.我永遠忘不了那一刻。我們看著這份手冊，心想老天這一切都是真的。於是我們著手製作能夠發出這種音頻的裝置。它的原理是這樣的，我們打長途電話時會聽到嘟嘟的聲音，聽起來像撥電話的按鍵音，頻率不同，但可以模擬。It turned out that was the signal from one telephone computer to another, controlling the computers in the network. And AT&T made a fatal flaw when they designed an original telephone network, digital telephone network, was they put the signal in from computer to computer in the same band as your voice, which meant if you could make those same signals, you could put it right into the handset. And literally, the entire AT&T international phone network would think that you were an AT&T computer. So after three weeks we finally built a box like this, it worked.實際上那是從一臺計算機傳到另一臺計算機的信號，它可以控制交換機的工作。AT&T公司設計的數字電話網路有嚴重漏洞，他們使用與聲音相同的頻段來發送控制信號。也就是說只要你模擬出相同的音頻信號，通過聽筒發送出去，整個AT&T的國際電話網就會把你當成一臺AT&T計算機。三週後我們做出了這樣的一個裝置，真的管用。And I remember the first call we made was down to, uh, LA, one of Woz『s relatives. We dialed the wrong number. But we woke some guy up in the middle of the night. We were yelling at him like 『Don』t you understand we made this call for free!』 and this person didn』t appreciate that.But it wasmiraculous.我記得第一個電話想打給Woz住在洛杉磯的親戚。我們撥錯了號碼，大半夜把某個傢伙吵醒了。我們興奮地沖他嚷嚷：打這個電話是免費的。對方一點也不感激我們，但這已經是奇蹟了。And we build these little boxes to do Blue Box as it was called. And we put a little note in the bottom of them, and our logo was he』s got the whole world in his hands, hahaha. And, they work. We built the best blue box in the world, it was all digital, no adjustments.我們做出了這個稱為「藍盒子」的裝置。盒子底部貼著我們的logo，寫著「世界握在手中」，這是世界上最好的「藍盒子」，全數字化，簡便易用。And, so you could go to the pay phone, you could, you know, take a trunk over the white plane, and take a satellite over the Europe, and then go to Turkey, take a cable back to Atlanta. You could go around the world, you could go around the world 5 or 6 times cause we learned all the codes and how to get on the satellite and stuff. And then you could call the pay phone next doors, so you could shout at the phone, after about a minute it would come to another phone, it was, it was miraculous.你可以拿著它去電話亭輕鬆撥打長途電話，打衛星電話去歐洲、去土耳其，然後接有線電話打回亞特蘭大，你可以滿世界跑，跑五六趟，因為我們知道所有的交換密碼。你可以給家門口的電話亭打電話，在家喊話，隔一會電話亭就能聽到，真是奇妙。And you might ask what so interesting about that. What so interesting is that we were young, and what we learned was that we could build something, ourselves, that could control billions of dollars worth of infrastructure in the world. That was what we learned, was that, us, two, you know, we didn』t know much, we could build the little thing that could control a giant thing. And that was anincredible lesson. I don』t think there would have ever been an Apple computer had there not been Blue Box. 你也許會問這樣做有意思嗎？它的意義在於雖然我們年紀還小，但已經意識到我們有能力做出控制龐大系統的工具。這就是我們得到的啟發，我們兩個人儘管懂得不多，但我們製造的小玩意可以控制龐然大物。這是不可思議的經歷，沒有「藍盒子」就不會有蘋果電腦。Woz said you called the Pope?Woz說你們給教皇打了電話？Yeah, we did call the Pope. He, uh, he pretended to be Henry Kissinger. And we get the number of the Vatican and we called the pope. They started waking people up in the hierarchy, you know,like that. And they actually sent someone to wake up the Pope. When finally we burst out laughing they realized that we weren』t Henry Kissinger. And, so we never got the talk to the Pope but it was very funny, so...沒錯，他冒充基辛格給教皇打電話。我們弄到梵蒂岡的電話號碼，打電話給教皇。教會的重要人物逐個被叫醒，最後終於派人把教皇叫起來。要不是我們憋不住哈哈大笑起來，他們還真以為是基辛格。雖然沒跟教皇通上話，但實在是搞笑。So the jump from Blue Boxes to personal computers, what sparked that?你們是怎麼從「藍盒子」想到做個人電腦的？Well, necessity. In a sense that there was time sharing computers available, and there was a time sharing company in Mountain View that we could get free time on. So, but we need is a terminal. And we couldn』t afford one. So we designed and built one. And that was the first thing we ever did, we built this terminal. 這很自然。當時Mountain View有分時共享計算機，我們可以免費上機。但我們需要一個終端，買不起就自己動手設計製作。這個終端是我們的第一件作品。So what an Apple I was, was really an extension of this terminal, putting a micro process around the back end. That what it was. It』s really a kind of two separate projects put together. So first we built the terminal and then we built the Apple I. Apple I是這臺終端的擴展，它用微處理器代替了後臺主機。就像是把兩個獨立的項目整合在一起，一開始是做終端，然後纔是Apple I。And we, we really built it for ourselves because we couldn』t afford to buy anything. And we scavenge parts here and there and stuff. And we built this all by hand. I mean it take, you know, 40 to 80 hours to build one, and it would always be breaking cause all these little tiny wires. So it turned out that a lot of our friends want to build them, too.自己動手做完全是因為我們買不起，我們四處收集零件，全部手工製作，做一臺大概要40~80小時，那些小零件太難安裝了。後來周圍很多朋友也想要。And although they couldscavenge most of the parts as well, they didn』t have the sort of skills to build them that we had acquired by training ourselves through building them. So we ended up helping them build most of their computers and it was really taking up all of our time.雖然他們也能弄到零件，但他們不具備製作經驗和技能。我們只好替他們做，這事佔用了我們所有時間。And we thought, you know, if we could make, what』s called printed circuit board, which is a piece of fabric glass with copper on both sides that etch to form the wire, so that you can build a computer, you know, you can build an Apple I in a few hours instead of 40 hours.於是我們想到製作印刷電路板，就是在鍍銅的玻璃纖維板兩面腐蝕出銅導線，採用印刷電路板，只要幾小時就能做出一臺Apple I。If we only had one of those, we could sell them to all of our friends for, you know as much as it cost to make them, make our money back. And everybody would be happy, we say, we get a life again.有了這些，我們能把電路板以成本價賣給朋友，把錢賺回來這樣皆大歡喜，我們也可以休息休息。So we did that. I sold my Volkswagen bus and Steve sold his calculator, we got enough money to pay a friend of us to make the art work to make a printed circuit board. And we made some printed circuit boards, and we sold some to our friends, and I was trying to sell the rest of them so we can get micro bus and calculator back….說幹就幹，我把玩具大眾車賣了，Woz賣了計算器。我們湊夠了錢，請朋友設計印刷電路板。電路板做出來後，賣給了朋友。我想把剩下的也賣了，把玩具車和計算器贖回來。And I walked into the first computer store in the world, which was the Byte Shop of a Mountain View, I think, on El Camino. It metamorphosized within an adult bookstore, but at this point, it was the Byte Shop. And the person I ran into, I think his name was Paul Terrell. He said 」You know, I』ll take 50 of those」, I said 「this is great」. 「 But I want them fully assembled.」我去了世界上第一家計算機商店，Mountain View的位元組商店，那時它藏在一家成人書店裡。我見到了老闆Paul Terrell，Paul說「我預訂50套」，我說「太好了。」「但我要完全組裝好的計算機」。We never thought of this before, so we then kicked this around, we thought 「Why not? Why not try this?」 And so I spent the next several days on the phone talking with electronic parts distributors, we didn』t know what we were doing, and we said, 「look, here is the parts that we need.」 We figured we』d buy a hundred sets of parts, build 50, sell them to the Byte Shop for twice what they cost us to build them, therefore paying for the whole hundred and then we have 50 left so we could make our profits by selling those. 我們從沒想過出售整機，不過還是答應了，何樂而不為呢？我花了好幾天打電話聯繫電子元件批發商，告訴對方需要哪些零件，我們完全是摸著石頭過河。我們打算買100套零件，做好後以兩倍的成本價賣給位元組商店50臺，剩下50臺就是我們的利潤。So we convince these distributors to give us the parts on next 30 days credit. We have no idea what that meant... 「30? sure... sign in here」, so we have 30 days to pay them. So we bought the parts, we built the products and we sold 50 of them to the Byte Shop in Palo Alto, and got paid in 29 days and went to pay off the parts people in 30 days. 我們說服批發商賒給我們零件，30天後還款。我倆就這樣懵懵懂懂地拿到了零件。Apple I做好後，賣了50臺給位元組商店。第29天才收到賬款，第30天正好付清賒零件的錢。And so we were in business, but we have the classic Marxian profit realization crisis, the profit wasn』t in liquid currency, our profit was in 50 computers sitting in the corner. So then all of a sudden, we had to think, wow, how we gonna realise our profit? So we started thinking aboutdistribution, are there any other computer stores? 我們就這樣做起了生意，不過也碰到利潤危機。我們的利潤不是現金，而是堆在角落的50臺電腦。我們不得不考慮如何實現利潤。我們想繼續尋找批發商，是不是還有其他計算機商店？We started calling the other computer stores we had heard across the country. We just kind of eased into business that way. The third key figure in the creation of Apple was the former Intel executive Mike Markkula. I ask Steve how he came aboard. We were designing the Apple II. And we really had some, some much higherambitions for the Apple II. 我們打電話給全國的計算機商店，就這樣做起了生意。蘋果的第三位關鍵創始人是英特爾前高管Mike Markkula。我問Steve他是怎麼入夥的。當時我們正在設計Apple II。我們對它充滿了期待。Woz"s ambitions were he wanted to add color grahpics. My ambition was that, it was very clear to me that a bunch of hardware hobbists, they could assemble around the computers, or at least take our board, and add the transformers for the power apply, the case, the keyboard, and go get, and etc. You know, go get rest of the stuff. Woz希望實現彩色圖形界面。我希望…當時有一大羣硬體愛好者，他們自己組裝電腦。或者用我們的主板，自己安裝電源、鍵盤等等。For everyone of those, there were a thousand of people, they couldn"t do that but wanted to mess around with programming, software hobbists, just like I had been, you know, when I was 10, discovering my computer. And so my dream for the Apple II was to sell the first real packaged computer, packaged personal computer. You didn"t have to be a hardwarehobbist at all. 還有許多人是軟體愛好者，他們只想寫程序。就像我10歲剛剛接觸計算機那樣。所以我希望Apple II成為第一款功能齊備的個人電腦。就算你不懂硬體也能輕鬆使用。And so combining both of those dreams, we actually designed a product. And I found the designer and we designed the packaging and everything. And we wanted to make it out of plastic and we had the whole thing ready to go. But we needed some money for tooling the cases and things like that. We needed a few thousand of dollars. And this was way beyond me. 這就是我們對Apple II的基本設想。我找到設計師，設計了所有細節。我們還打算使用塑料機身，什麼都想好了。可我們資金不足，還缺幾萬美元。So I went looking for some venture capital. And I ran across one venture capitalist name Don Valentine, who came over to the garage and he later said I look like a renegade from the human race, that was his famousquote. And he said he wasn"t willing to invest us but he recommended a few people to mine. One of those was Mike Markkula. 於是我開始尋找風險投資。我找到Don Valentine，他還來參觀了我的車庫。他說我看起來像人類的叛逆者，這話成了他的名言。雖然他不打算投資，但推薦了幾個人給我。其中就有Mike Markkula。So I called Mike on the phone and he came over. And Mike had retired for about 30 or 31 from the Intel, he was a product manager there and got a little bit stock. And, you know, like made a million bucks on stock options, which at that time was quite a lot of money. 我給Mike打電話，跟他見了面。Mike以前是英特爾的產品經理。他大概30歲離開英特爾，手裡有英特爾的股票。他靠股票期權賺了一百多萬，當時非常富有。And he a bit invest in oiling and gas deals and kind of staying at home, doing that sort of thing. And he, I think, was, was kind of ask him get back into something. And Mike and I hit it off very well. And so Mike said, "OK, I"ll invest", after a few weeks and I said "No, we don"t want your money , we want you." So we convince Mike to actually throw in with us, as an euqal partner. 他在家投資石油、天然氣之類的生意。我感覺他想幹一番大事業，我倆聊得很投機。最後Mike答應投資。幾周後我說我們不光要錢，我們希望你入夥。"於是Mike成了我們的合作夥伴。And so Mike put in some money, and Mike put in himself, and three of us went off. We took this design, and it was virtually done as an Apple II, and tooled it up, and announced it, a few months later at the West Coast Computer Faire. 他不僅投資，還參與創業，我們就這樣起步了。我們拿出Apple II的設計，召開新聞發布會。幾個月後Apple II首次在西海岸計算機展覽會上露面。What was that like? 情況怎麼樣？It was great. We got the best, you know this West Coast Computer Faire was small at that time, but to us it was very large, and, so we had this fantastic booth there, er, we had a projection television showing the Apple II and showing itsgraphics which today look very cool but at that time were by far the most advanced graphics on the personal computer. And I think, you know, my recollection is that we stole the show, and a lot of dealers and distributors started lining up and we were off and running. 妙不可言，Apple II最受歡迎。那時西海岸計算機展覽會規模不大，但對我們而言已經很大了。我們在展臺上用投影展示Apple II和它的圖形界面。現在看有些簡單，但當時是PC上最先進的圖形界面。我們出盡了風頭。批發商和經銷商蜂擁而至，進展非常順利。How old were you? 當時你多大？21.21。21? you were 21 and you were a big success, you have just sort of done it by the seat of your pants. You don』t have any particular training on this. How do you learn to run a company? 21歲就這麼大成功。可你從來沒有這方面的經驗，完全是憑直覺。你是怎麼學會管理公司的？er… you know, throughout the years in business, I found something, which was I always ask why we do things, and the answers youinevitably get are 「oh that』s just the way it』s done」, nobody knows why they do what they do, nobody thinks about things very deeply in business, that』s what I found. I』d like to give you an example. 在生意場多年，我發現一個現象。我做事前總問為什麼。可得到答案永遠是「我們向來這樣做」。沒人反思為什麼這麼做，我給你舉個例子。When we were building our apple Is in the garage, we knew exactly what they cost. When we got into factory in the Apple II days, the accounting had this notion of the standard cost, where you kind of set a standard cost at the end of a quarter, and you adjust with the varies, and I kept asking why do we do this? 我們在車庫裡組裝Apple I時，成本算得清清楚楚。可工廠生產Apple II時，財務部使用的是標準成本。每個季度估算標準成本，然後根據實際情況調整。於是我不斷追問，為什麼要這樣做？And the answer is 「that』s just the way it』s done」, and after about 6 months of digging into this, what I realized was the reason you do it is because you don』t really have good enough controls to know about how much cost, so you guess, and you fix your guess at the end of the quarter. And the reason why you don』t know how much it cost is because your information systems aren』t good enough. So ...but nobody said it that way.得到的答覆是，這是一貫的做法。6個月後我發現其實是因為我們無法精確計算成本，所以只能先估算，然後進行修正。根本原因是信息管理系統不夠完善。但沒有人承認這一點。So later on when we design this automatic factory for Mackintosh, we were able to get rid of a lot of these antiquated concepts, and know exactly what something costs to the second. So in business, a lot of things are … I call it 「folklore」, they are done because they were done yesterday, and the day before. And ...so what that means is that if you are willing to sort of ask a lot of questions, think about things and work really hard, you can learn business pretty fast, not the hardest thing in the world.後來我們為Mackintosh設計自動化工廠，拋開這些陋習，做到了精確控制所有成本。生意場上有很多約定俗成的規定，我稱為陳規陋習，因為以前這樣做，所以就一直這樣做下去。所以只要你多提問多思考，腳踏實地工作，你很快就能的學會經商，這不是什麼難事。Not rocket science?不是什麼深奧的技術？It』s not rocket science.不是。Now...when you were first coming in contact with these computers and inventing them before the HP1900, you do talk about writing programs. What sort of programs? What do people actually do with these things?最早接觸HP1900時，你談到自己編程的事。都是些什麼樣的程序？用途是什麼？See what we did with them, well, I would give you a simple example … when we were designing our blue-box we used… we wrote a lot of custom programs to help us design it. you know to do a lot of the dog work for us in terms of calculating, master frequencies with sub devisor to get the other frequencies and things like that…we use computer quite a bit tocalculate how much error we would get in the frequencies, and how much can be tolerated. so we use them in the work, but much more importantly, it does nothing to do with using them for anything practical…have to do with using them to be a mirror of your thought process, to actually learn how to think.舉個簡單的例子，我們設計「藍盒子」時，寫了很多程序，用來處理繁瑣的計算工作，計算主頻、分頻之類的東西，還計算不同頻率的差錯率和容錯性。編程可以幫助我們完成工作，它沒有明確的實用性，重要的是我們把它看作思考的鏡子，學習如何思考。I think the greatest value of learning how to think.... I think everybody in this country should learn how to program a computer, should learn a computer language, because it teaches you how to think, it』s like going to law school, I don』t think anybody should be a lawyer, but I think going to law school may actually be usefulcoz it teaches you how to think in a certain way. In the same way the computer programming teaches you in a slightly different way how to think... And so … I view computer science as a liberal art. It should be something everybody takes in a year in their life, one of the courses they take is, you know learning how to program.我認為學習思考最大的價值在於... 我覺得所有美國人都應該學習編程，學習一門編程語言，學習編程教你如何思考，就像學法律一樣，學法律的人未必都成為律師，但法律教你一種思考方式。同樣編程會教你另一種思考方式，所以我把計算機科學看成基礎教育，是每個人都應該花一年時間學習的課程。I learned APL, you know, obviously, is part of the reason why I"m going through life sideways.我學了APL，很明顯它豐富了我的人生。Was it you look back and consider it, enriching experience that taught you to think in a different way, or not?你有沒有覺得它教給你獨特的思考方式?Err... No, not that particularly. Other language perhaps more so, I started with APL. So I mean, obviously, the Apple II was a terrific success, just incredibly so. And the company grew like topsy and eventually went public. and you guys got really rich. What"s it like to get rich?他語言也許更明顯些，我最先學的APL。顯然Apple II很成功，公司飛速發展，成功上市。 你們都成了富翁，富有的感覺如何？It"s very interesting. I was worth, err, about over an million dollars when I was 23, and over 10 million dollars when I was 24, and over a hundred million dollars when I was 25. And it wasn"t that important, Because I never did it for the money. I think money is wonderful thing because it enables you to do things; it enables you to invest ideas that don"t have a short term payback and things like that. But especially at that point in my life, it was not the most important thing.很有趣，我23歲擁有超過100萬美元的財產。24歲超過了一千萬，25歲超過了一億. 但這不重要，我不是沖著錢去的。 錢允許你做想做的事. 錢讓你實現那些短期內看不到效益的創意. 但錢不是最重要的。The most important thing was the company, the people, the products we were making, what we were going to enable people do with these products. So I didn"t think about it a great deal and I never sold any stock, and just really believe the company would do very well over the long term. Central to the development of the personal computers was the pioneering work being done at Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, which Steve first visited in 1979. I had 3 or 4 people who kept bugging me that I get my rear over the Xerox Park and see what they are doing. And so I finally did. I went over there, and they were very kind and they showed me what they were working on.重要的是公司、人才、產品，是產品帶給客戶的價值. 所以我不太看重金錢，我從不出售蘋果的股票。我相信公司會發展得越來越好。 1979年喬布斯第一次拜訪施樂Palo Alto研究中心, 在PC成形之初，Palo Alto研究中心起到了關鍵作用。 同事一直慫恿我去施樂公司，看看他們在做什麼。於是我去了，對方非常友好地展示了他們的研究。And they showed me really three things, but I was so blinded by the first one that I didn"t ever really see the other two. One of the things they show me was object oriented programming, they show me that. But I didn"t even see that. The other one they show me was really a network computer system, they had over hundred Alto computers all network using email, etc, I didn』t even see that. I was so blinded by the first thing they showed me, which wasgraphically user interface. I thought it was the best thing I had ever seen in my life. Now, remember, it was very flawed, when we saw it, it was incomplete, they had done bunch of things wrong, but we didn『t know that at that time, it』s still though they have the germ of the idea was there, and they had done it very well…他們展示了三個項目， 但我完全被第一個項目吸引了，另兩個沒怎麼看。 我記得有一個項目是面向對象編程，我沒怎麼看. 還有一個是計算機網路系統。 當時他們已經有上百臺聯網的計算機，可以互發email，也沒有吸引我。吸引我的是圖形用戶界面，那是我見過的最漂亮的東西。雖然現在看來它還很粗糙，有瑕疵，但是當時我們還看不出來，這個創意太棒了，他們做得很好。And within, you know, 10 minutes, it was obvious to me that all computers would work like this someday, it was obvious, I mean you can argue about how many years it would take, and you can argue about who the winners and losers might be, but you couldn』t argue about the inevitability it was so obvious, you would have felt the same way had you been there.很快我就意識到所有計算機都應該變成這樣。我們可以爭論要久後能現實，誰會是最後的贏家。但是沒人會質疑圖形界面是必然的發展方向。如果你當時在場，你也會這樣想的。You know, that』s … those were exactly words Paul Allen used. It』s really interesting. Paul Allen也說過同樣的話, 真有趣。Yeah, it』s obvious.是的，顯而易見。But there were two visits… you saw and you brought some people back with you, and what happened the next time, they made you cool your heels for a while. 聽說你去參觀了兩次，第二次你帶了些人去。對方是不是讓你們坐了冷板凳？No.沒有。Someone (a woman) said something.有人說過。what do you mean?我不明白。Well, she did the demo when the group came back; she said that she argued against doing it for 3 hours, and they took you to other places showing you other things while she was arguing.她說是她負責向你們展示的圖形界面。起先她拒絕展示，大約僵持了3個鐘頭。這期間對方只好先帶你們參觀其他的項目。Oh… you mean they werereluctant to show us the demo. oh, I have no idea. I don』t remember that, I thought you meant something else.你是說他們不太樂意讓我們參觀。這個我一點不知道，沒印象了。So they were very skillful.看來對方掩飾得很巧妙。Yeah, but they did show us. And it』s good they showed us because the technology crashed and burned Xerox, they used to call...是的，不過他們還是讓我們參觀了。還好他們讓我們參觀了，因為施樂後來被拖垮了……Why?為什麼？what』s that? Why?怎麼啦？為什麼？Yeah, why?對，為什麼？I actually thought a lot about that, and I learned more about that with John Sculley later on and I think I understand that now pretty well. What happens is, like with John Sculley, err…John came from Pepsi co, and they almost would change their product once every 10 years, to them, new product is like a new size of bottle, so if you are a product person, you couldn』t change the course of that company very much, so whoinfluences the success of Pepsi co?我一直在思考這個問題。認識約翰?斯卡利以後，我現在有了清晰的答案。是這樣，就像斯卡利一樣，他以前在百事可樂工作，他們的產品可以數十年不變，頂多更換可樂瓶子的尺寸。所以產品部門的人說話沒什麼份量。在百事公司誰最有發言權？The sales and marketing people, therefore they would once get promoted and therefore they would once run the company. Well, for Pepsi co, that might have been okay. But it turns out the same thing can happen in technology companies, that they getmonopolies, like old IBM and Xerox. If you are a product person at IBM or Xerox, so you make a better copy or a better computer, so what?是營銷部門的人，他們很容易升職從而掌管公司。對百事來說，這不是件壞事。問題是壟斷科技公司也有這種情況，比如IBM和施樂。即便IBM和施樂的產品經理能做出更棒的產品，那又怎麼樣？When you have a monopolies market share, the company is not any more successful. So the people who can make the company more successful are sales and marketing people.And they end up running the companies, and the product people get driven out of this decision making forms. And the companies forget what it means to make great products. It... Sort of the productsensibility, and... The product genius brought them to that monopolistic position gets rotted out by people running this companies who have no conception of a good product versus a bad product.這些已經壟斷市場的公司很難靠新產品提高業績。要想提高業績還得依靠營銷部門。於是他們逐漸控制公司，而產品部門的人被邊緣化。公司就喪失了打造優秀的產品熱情和能力。產品部門的功臣慢慢被不懂產品的人排擠。They have no conception of craftsmanship that』s required … that take a good idea and turn it into a good product. And they really have no feeling in their hearts usually about wanting to really help the customers. So that』s what happens in Xerox, the people in Xerox PARC used to call the people who run the Xerox tonerheads, and these tonerheads would come out to the Xerox and PARC says they have no clue of what they are saying.後者通常缺少研發產品的技術和能力。而且也並非打心底願意替客戶解決問題。施樂公司就是這樣。施樂研究院的人私底下把管理層叫做墨粉腦袋，而這些管理人員完全不明白為什麼被嘲笑。For our audience, toner is what?觀眾可能不清楚墨粉是什麼？Toner is what you put in a copier; you know the toner you add to an industrial copier?就是複印機裏用的墨粉。The black stuff?那個黑色的東西？The black stuff, yeah. Basically they were copier heads, just have no clue about what a computer can do, and so they just grabbed the feed from great victory of the computer industry, Xerox could have owned the entire computer industry, could have been company 10 times of its size, could have been IBM, Could have been IBM in the 1990』s, …. could have been the Microsoft in the 1990』s. So ... But anyway that』s all ancient history, doesn』t really matter anymore.是的。這些墨粉腦袋壓根不知道計算機能做什麼，他們不過是碰巧趕上了計算機產業的順風車，施樂本來有機會把規模擴大10倍，獨佔整個行業。就像90年代的IBM或微軟，不過都已經過去了，不重要了。Sure. You mentioned IBM, when IBM entered the market, was that a daunting thing for you at apple?的確如此。你提到IBM，IBM進入PC市場是不是對蘋果構成了威脅？Oh sure. I mean… here was apple, you know a 1 billion dollar company, and here was IBM, at that time, probably about 30 some billion company entering the market, sure. it was very scary. Err... we made a very big mistake though, that IBM』s first product was terrible. It was really bad. We made a mistake of… not realizing that a lot of other people have strong vested interests to help IBM to make it better. So ...If it has just been IBM, it would have crashed and burned. But IBM did have I think a genius in their approach, which was to have a lot of people have vested interests in their success. And that』s what saved them in the end.那當然，蘋果當時的市值只有10億，而IBM大約是300億。確實讓人膽寒，儘管IBM的第一款產品十分糟糕，但我們太輕敵了，我們忽略了很多人的利益與IBM捆綁在一起，如果沒有這些幫助，IBM早就輸了。IBM的確很高明，它建立了強大的同盟陣營，終於救了它一命。So you came back from visiting Xerox PARC with a vision, and how do youimplement the vision?你從施樂研究中心找到了靈感，如何付諸行動呢？Well, I got our best people together and started to get them working on this. The problem was we hired a bunch of people from HP, and they didn』t get this idea, they didn』t get it. I remember having dramatic arguments with some of these people, who thought the coolest thing in user interface was the soft keys at the bottoms of the screen, you know. They have no concept ofproportionally spaced fonts, no concept of the mouse.馬上召集身邊的骨幹來實現這個創意。問題是從惠普跳槽來的幾個人不理解圖形界面的本質，我跟他們大吵過幾次，他們覺得圖形界面就是在屏幕下方加上幾個按鈕，完全不明白比例字體和滑鼠的重要性。As a matter of fact, I remember arguing with these folks, people screaming at me, it could take us 5 years to engineer a mouse and it would cost 300 dollars to build. I finally got fed up and just went outside and found David Kelly design, I asked him to design me a mouse in 90 days and we had a mouse that we can build for 15 bucks and that wasphenomenally reliable. So I found that, in a way... Apple did not have the caliber of people that was necessary to seize this idea in many ways. That was core team did, but there was a larger team that mostly had come from HP that didn』t have a clue.我記得他們和我爭執不下，沖我大嚷大叫。說什麼研發滑鼠至少要5年，成本不會低於300美元。把我搞煩了，我找到David Kelly設計公司。對方90天後設計出了質量穩定的滑鼠，成本只要15美元。我這才發現蘋果沒有足夠人才來實現這個創意。核心團隊有這個能力，但是許多從惠普跳槽來的成員不行。It comes to this issue of professionalism, there』s dark side and light side? Isn』t it?這涉及到職業分工的問題，每個人特長不同，不是嗎？No, you know what it is... No, it』s not dark and light. People get confused, companies get confused, when they started getting bigger, they want to replicate their initial success, and a lot of them think well somehow there are some magic in the process, of how success is created... so they started to try toinstitutionalize process across the company. And before very long, people get very confused that the process is the content…that』s ultimately the downfall of IBM.不，這不是擅長與否的問題，而是他們犯糊塗，公司也在犯糊塗。公司規模擴大之後，就會變得因循守舊，他們覺得只要遵守流程，就能奇蹟般地繼續成功，於是開始推行嚴格的流程制度，很快員工就把遵守流程和紀律當作工作本身。IBM就是這樣走下坡路的。IBM has the best process people in the world, they just forgot about the content. And that』s so what happened a little bit at apple too, we had a lot of people who are great at management process, they just didn』t have a clue at the content, and in my career, I found that the best people you know are the ones who really understand the content, and they are pain in the butt to manage, you know but you put up with it because they are so great at the content, and that』s what makes a great product, it』s not process, it』s content.IBM的員工是世界上最守紀律的，他們恰恰忽略了產品，蘋果也有這個問題，我們有很多擅長管理流程的人才，但是他們忽略了產品本身，經驗告訴我，優秀的人才是那些一心想著產品的人，雖然這些人很難管理，但是我寧願和他們一起工作，光靠流程和制度做不出好產品。So we had a little bit of that problem at apple. And that problem eventually resulted in the Lisa, which had its moment of brilliance, in a way it was very far ahead at its time…but that was not enoughfundamental content understanding. Apple drifted too far away from its roots. To these HP guys, 10,000 dollars was cheap, to our market, to our distribution channels, 10,000 dollars was impossible. So, we produced the product which completely mismatch for the culture of our company, for the image of our company, for the distribution channels of our company, for the current customers. None of them could afford a product like that. And it failed.蘋果也有這方面的問題。這些問題最終導致Lisa電腦失敗。Lisa是一款非常超前的產品，但是它過於超前了，以致偏離了產品的宗旨，在這些從惠普跳槽來的人眼裡，1萬美元的零售價不貴，但是市場和經銷商覺得這個價格太離譜了。Lisa的定位徹底背離了蘋果的企業文化，背離了公司的形象，也背離了經銷商與消費者的期待。蘋果的老顧客根本買不起這麼貴的產品。所以它失敗了。Like you and John Couch fought for leadership?就如同你同John Couch對領導權的爭奪一般？Absolutely, and I lost. That』s correct.是的，我輸了。How did they come about?為什麼會起爭執？Well... I thought Lisa was in serious trouble, and I thought Lisa was going off this very bad direction as I have just described, and err... I couldn"t convince enough people and the senior management of Apple, but that was the case...we ran the places as team for most part. So I lost, and at that point of time, you know I bruted for a few months…but it was not very long after that it really occurred to me that if we didn"t do something here, the Apple II was running out of gas, and we needed to do something with thistechnology fast, or else Apple might cease to exist as the company that it was. So I formed a small team to do the Mackintosh, and we were on a mission from God to save Apple. 我認為Lisa當時面臨困境，而且越陷越深，我沒能爭取到大多數高管的支持，所以我也無能為力，只能服從團隊的決定。我失敗了，那段時間我很消沉。但我很快意識到如果不振作起來，Apple II會重蹈覆轍，應該儘快利用這些新技術，否則蘋果將止步不前。所以我組織了一個小組研發Mackintosh，就像是奉了上帝的旨意來拯救蘋果。No one else thought so, but it turned out we were right. And as we evolved the Mac, it became very clear that, this was also a way of re-inventing Apple. We re-invented everything, we re-invented manufactures, I visited probably 80 automatic factories in Japan, and we built the world"s first automatic computer factory in the world, in California here, so we adopted the 16,000 Micro Processors that leads ahead, wenegotiated the price that was 1/5 of what Lisa was going to pay for, because we were using much higher volume, and we really started to design this product that can be sold for a thousand dollars, called the Mackintosh, and we didn"t make it. 其他人並不這樣想，但事實證明我們做的沒錯，在研發Mac的過程中，我越發覺得我們是在重建蘋果。我們大刀闊斧地改革，重新設計了生產線，我去日本參觀了大約80家自動化工廠，然後回加州建了世界上第一條生產計算機的自動生產線，我們採購了1萬6千顆最先進的微處理器，由於數採購量大，價格不到Lisa的1/5，我們打算把Mackintosh打造成一款平價產品，可惜沒成功。We could have sold it at 2000 dollars, but we came out 2,500, and we spent 4 years in our lives doing that and we built the product, we built the automatic factory, the machine to build the machine, we built a completely newdistribution system, and we built a completely different marketing approach, and I think we worked pretty well. 原定價格是2000美元，最終價格是2500美元，這款產品花了我們4年時間。搭建了自動化工廠和生產線，採用了全新的銷售渠道和營銷方法。我覺得我們幹得很出色。Now, you motivated this team, I mean you have to guide them... 是你在鞭策這個團隊，引導他們。We built the team. 團隊是我們建立的。You built the team, motivated, guided them dealt with them. We have interviewed just lots and lots of people from the Mackintosh team, and you know what keeps coming down to is your passion, and your vision, how do you order your priorities in there? What"s important to you in the development of a product? 你建立了團隊，而且負責鞭策和引導它。我們採訪過很多Mackintosh團隊成員。他們都提到你的工作熱情和獨特的想法。你是如何處理工作的輕重緩急的？你覺得什麼對產品最重要？You know... one of the things that really hurt Apple was after I left, John Sculley got a very serious "disease", and that "disease", I have seen other people get it too, it"s the "disease" of thinking that a really great idea is 90% of the work, and if you just tell all these other people, "here is this great idea!", then of course they can go off and make it happen. And the problem with that is that there is justtremendous amount ofcraftsmanship in between a great idea and a great product. And as you evolve the great idea, it changes and grows, it never comes out like it starts. 我離開蘋果以後，發生了一件幾乎毀掉蘋果的事。John Sculley有個嚴重的"毛病"，我在其他人身上也見到過。那就盲目樂觀，以為光憑創意就能取得成功。他覺得只要想到絕妙的主意，公司就一定可以實現，問題在於優秀的創意與產品之間隔著巨大的鴻溝，實現創意的過程中，想法會發生變化甚至變得面目全非。Because you learn a lot more, you get into the subtleties, you also find ... There"s tremendous trade-offs that you have to make, I mean you know there are just certain things you can"t make electrons do, there are certain things you can"t make plastic do, or glass do, and... or factories do, robots do, and you get into all these things, designing a product is keeping 5000 things in your brain. These concepts, and fitting them all together in... and kind of continuing to push and fit them together and in new and in different ways to get what you want. And everyday you discover something new that is new problem or new opportunity to fit these things together a little differently. It"s that process that is the magic. 因為你會發現新東西，思考也更深入，你不得不一次次權衡利弊，做出讓步和調整。總有些問題是電子設備解決不了的，是塑料、玻璃材料無法實現的，或者是工廠和機器人做不到的。設計一款產品，你得把五千多個問題裝進腦子裡，必須仔細梳理，嘗試各種組合，才能獲得想要的結果。每天都會發現新問題，也會產生新靈感，這個過程很重要。So we had a lot of great ideas when we started, but what I always felt that a team of people doing something that"s really believing is like ... When I was a young kid, there was a widowed man lived up the street. And he was in his eighties, he was a little scary looking, and I got to know him a little bit... I think he might pay me for cutting mow his lawn or something …One day he said "come along to my garage, I want to show you something." 無論開始時有多少絕妙的主意，我一直覺得團隊的合作就像是…我小時候，街上住著一位獨居老人，他大概80歲，看上去兇巴巴的，我認識他，我想讓他僱我幫他修剪草坪，有一天他說"到我車庫來，我給你看點東西"。And he pulled out his dusty old rock tumbler, that was amotor and a coffee can and a little band between them, and he said "come out with me", we went out to the back, and we got some just rocks, some regular old ugly rocks, and we put them in the can with a little bit of liquid and a little bit of grits powder, and we closed the can up and he turned this motor on, and he said, "come back tomorrow". 他拖出一檯布滿灰塵的磨石機，一邊是馬達，一邊是研磨罐，用皮帶連著。他說"跟我來"，我們到屋後撿了些很普通的石頭。我們把石頭倒進研磨罐，加上溶劑和沙礫。他蓋好蓋子，開動電機，對我說"明天再來"。And this can was making rack of his stones, and I came back the next day, and we opened the can, and we took out these amazingly beautiful polished rocks, err... the same common stones that go in through rubbing against each other like this, creating a little bit of friction, creating a little bit of noise, had come out these beautiful polished rocks. And that"s always been in my mind that, my metaphor for a team working really hard on something they"repassionate about. It"s that through the team, through that group of incredibly talented people bumping up against each other, having arguments, having fights sometimes, making some noise, and working together they polish each other. and they polish the ideas, and what comes out are these really beautiful stones. 磨石機開始研磨石頭，第二天我又去了。我們打開罐子，看到了打磨得異常圓潤美麗的石頭。看上去普普通通的石頭就像這樣互相磨擦著。互相碰撞，發出噪音，最終變成了光滑美麗的石頭。我一直用這件事比喻竭盡全力工作的團隊。正是通過團隊合作，通過這些精英的相互碰撞。通過辯論、對抗、爭吵、合作，相互打磨。磨礪彼此的想法，才能創造出美麗的"石頭"。So it"s hard to explain, and it"s certainly not the result of one person. I mean people like symbols, so I am the symbol of certain things. But it"s really the team effort on the Mac. Now, in my life I observed something fairly early on at Apple, which … I didn"t know how to explain it then, I felt a lot about sense. Most things in life, the dynamic range between average and the best, is at most 2 to 1. Like you are in New York city, you get an average Taxi cab driver versus the best Taxi cab driver, you know you would probably get to yourdestination with the best cab maybe 30% faster, you know in automobile. What"s the difference between an average and the best? Maybe, I don"t know 20%? 這很難解釋，但顯然這並不是某個人的成就。人們喜歡偶象，大家只關注我，但為Mac奮鬥的是整個團隊。我以前在蘋果就發現一種現象，很難表達出來，更像是一種感覺，生活中多數東西，最好與普通之間的差距不超過兩倍。好比說紐約的計程車司機，最棒的司機與普通司機之間的差距大概是30%，最好與普通之間的差距有多大呢？20%？The best CD player and an average CD player, I don"t know, 20%? 2 to 1 is a big..big dynamic range in most life. In software, and it used to be the case with hardware too. The difference between average and the best is 15 to 1, maybe a 100 to 1, Okay? Very few things in life are like this. But what I was lucky enough to spend my life in, is like this, and so I built lots of my success of finding these truly gifted people, and not settling for being C players, really going for A players. They really like working with each other, because they never had a chance to do that before, and they don"t want to work with being C players, so they become self-policing, they only want to hire more A players. So you built up these pockets of A players and itpropagates, and that"s what the Mac team was like, they were all A players, and these were extraordinarily talented people. 最棒的CD機與普通CD機的差距有多大？20%？這種差距很少超過兩倍。但是在軟體行業，還有硬體行業，這種差距有可能超過15倍，甚至100倍。這種現象很罕見，能進入這個行業，我感到很幸運，我的成功得益於我發現了許多才華橫溢、不甘平庸的人才，而且我發現只要召集到五個這樣的人，他們就會喜歡上彼此合作的感覺，前所未有的感覺，他們會不願再與平庸者合作，只招聘一樣優秀的人，所以你只要找到幾個精英，他們就會自己擴大團隊。Mac團隊就是這樣，大家才華橫溢，都很優秀。But there were also people who now say that they don"t have the energy any more to work for you. 但是有人說他們再也不願意為你工作了。Huh, true. I think if you talk to a lot of people on the Mac team, they would tell you it was the hardest they have ever worked in their lives. Some of them would tell you it was their happiest they ever had in their lives, but all of them would tell you that it certainly is one of the most intense andcherished experiences they would ever have in their lives. 呃，的確。大多數Mac團隊成員認為那是他們這輩子最辛苦的日子。有些人覺得那是一生中最幸福的日子，但是沒人否認那是這輩子最難忘、最珍貴的經歷。Yeah, they did. 沒錯。So...err... you know, it"s a … some of those things are not sustainable for some people. 只是有些人無法長時間忍受這樣的工作。What does it mean when you tell someone they work a shit? 你說別人"工作很爛"時，想表達什麼？I … it usually means they work a shit. Sometimes it means I think you work a shit, and I am wrong. Hehe, but .. it usually means that their work is not anywhere near good enough. 嗯……就是他們幹得很爛。有時是我認為你幹得很爛，也許我錯了。一般是說他們的工作很不合格。I have this great quote from Bill Atkinson, who says "when you say get someone to work a shit, you really mean.... I don"t quite understand, would you please explain it to me?" Bill Atkinson說這話的真正含義是"我聽不懂，請再解釋一遍"。Haha, no, that"s not usually what I meant. I... you know, when you get really good people, they know they are really good, and you don"t have to baby people"s ego so much, and what really matters is the work, that everybody knows that and that all that matters is the work. So people are being counted on to dospecific pieces of little puzzle, and the most important thing I think you can do for somebody who"s really good, and who"s really being counted on is to point out to them when their work isn"t good enough. And you need to do it in a way that doesn"t call in questions about your confidence and abilities, but... leaves not too much room forinterpretation that the work they have done for the particular thing is not good enough… to support the goal of the team. 哈哈，不是的，我不是這個意思。要知道與優秀、自信的人合作，不用太在乎他們的自尊。大家的心思都放在工作上，每個人負責完成一塊很具體的任務，如果他們的工作不合格，你要做的無非是提醒他們，清晰明瞭地提醒他們恢復工作狀態，同時不能讓對方懷疑你的權威性，要用無可置疑的方式告訴他們工作不合格。And that"s a hard thing to do. Err... I always take a very direct approach, so I think if you talk to people who worked with me, err... the really good people have found itbeneficial, some people hated it you know, but … I am also one of these people, I don"t really care about being right, I just care about success. So you will find a lot of people that would tell you that I had a very strong opinion, and they present evidence in contrary and 5 minutes later I can change my mind, because I"m like that, I don"t mind being wrong, and I admit that I am wrong a lot, doesn"t really matter to me too much. What matters to me is that we do the right thing. 這很不容易，所以我總是採取最直截了當的方式。有些同事覺得這種方式很好，但有些人接受不了。我是那種只想成功，不在乎是非的人。所以無論我原來的想法多麼頑固，只要反駁的人拿出可信的事實，五分鐘內我就會改變觀點，我就是這樣，不怕犯錯。我經常承認錯誤，沒什麼大不了的，我只在乎結果。So how and why did Apple get into desktop publishing, which will become Mac"s killer-app? 蘋果為什麼研發桌面排版？它是Mac最受歡迎的應用。I don"t know if you know this, but we got the first Canon laser printer engine shipped to US at Apple, and we had it hooked up to a Lisa actually imaging pages before anybody, long before HP, long before Adobe. But I heard few times people tell me "hey there"s these guys over the garage in Xerox PARC... let"s go and see them" and I finally went and saw them, I saw what they were doing, and it was better than what we were doing. They were gonna be a hardware company they wanted to make printer and the whole thing. So I talked to them being a software company and within 2 or 3 weeks, we had cancelled our internal project. 我們是全美第一個試用佳能激光列印引擎的公司。早在惠普和Adobe之前，我們就已經把它用在Lisa電腦上了，後來我聽說有人在施樂的車庫裡搗騰類似的玩意，我去參觀，發現他們比我們做得更好。他們打算成立一家硬體公司，生產印表機，我勸他們成立一家軟體公司，就是Adobe。兩三週後我撤消了蘋果內部的桌面出版項目。A bunch of people wanted to kill me over this. But, we did it. And I had cut a deal with Adobe User Software, and we bought 19.9% of Adobe to Apple, they needed financing and we want a little bit control. we were off to the races so we got the engine from Canon, and we designed the first laser printer controller at Apple. We got the software from Adobe, we introduced the laser writer. No one at the company wanted to do it, but a few of us in the Mac group, everybody thought a 7000-dollar printer was crazy, what they didn"t understand was that you can share it with Apple Talk, I mean they understoodintellectually, but they don"t understand visionary. 有些人恨死我了，但還是撤消了。蘋果和Adobe達成協議，買下了他們19.9%的股份。然後買下佳能的激光列印引擎，自己開發驅動軟體，接著從Adobe購買排版軟體，激光印表機就這樣面市了。除了Mac團隊，公司其他人都不看好激光印表機。他們覺得一臺印表機定價7000美元太貴。可他們忘了客戶可以通過Apple Talk共享印表機。雖然他們知道這項功能，但看不到它的潛力。Because the last really expensive thing we tried to sell was Lisa. So we pushed this through, and I had basically do it through over a few "dead bodies. And we pushed this thing through and it was the first laser printer on the market as you know, and the rest of history. When I left Apple, Apple was the largest printer company, measure by revenue in the world. It lost thatdistinction to HP about 3 or 4 years after I left, unfortunately, but when I left it was the largest printer company in the world. 畢竟他們對Lisa電腦糟糕的市場表現記憶猶新。我們堅持上馬印表機項目，得罪了不少人。第一臺激光印表機就這樣面市了。我離開時，蘋果是世界上最大的激光印表機公司，只過了三四年惠普就追上來了，真可惜。Did you envision desktop publishing, was that a no-brainer? 你預見到桌面出版的前景嗎，還是顯而易見的？You know… yes, but we also envisioned really the network office, and so in January, 1995 when we had our annual meeting and introduced our new products, I made probably the largest marketing blunder of my career. Bob: 1985. Steve: 1985, sorry. Made probably the largest marketing blunder in my career by announcing the Mackintosh Office instead of just desktop publishing. And we had desktop publishing as a majorcomponent of that, but we announced a bunch of other stuff as well, and I think we should just focus on desktop publishing at that time. [After series of disagreements with Apple"s CEO, John Sculley, Steve left the company in 1985.] 是的，我預見到了。但是我們同時還想推廣網路辦公，所以1995年發布新產品時，我犯了這輩子最大的營銷錯誤。Bob: 是1985年。Steve: 1985年，對不起。我們發布了Mackintosh Office辦公系統，其中包括桌面出版，當時應該集中力量推桌面出版，而不是所有功能一擁而上。[1985年喬布斯被CEO John Sculley排擠，離開了蘋果]Tell us your departure from Apple. 說說你離開蘋果的情況。Oh it was very painful and I am not even sure if I want to talk about it. What can I say? I hired the wrong guy. 很痛苦，我都不太願意聊這事。怎麼說呢？我招錯了人。That was Sculley? 是指Sculley？Yeah, and he destroyed something I spent 10 years working for. Starting with me, but that wasn"t the saddest part. I would have gladly left Apple if Apple had turned out like I wanted it to. Hebasically got on a rocket ship that is about to leave the pad, and the rocket ship left the pad, and he kind of went into his head, and he gotconfused and thought he built the rocket ship, and he kind of changed the trajectory, so that it"s inevitably gonna crash to the ground. 是的，他毀了我十年的心血。他逼我離職，但這還不是最糟糕的。如果蘋果能按我的設想發展，我會很開心。他僥倖登上了一艘正要發射的火箭。他還以為自己建造了火箭。輕率改變火箭的飛行軌道，結果是箭毀人亡。But there was always … in Pre-Mackintosh days and early Mackintosh days, there was always Steven and John show. You two were kinda joined at the hip for a while there. 可是在Mackintosh時期，你倆總是一起出現在媒體上，幾乎形影不離。That"s right. 沒錯。And then something happened to spilt you, what was that, what was that? 後來怎麼會產生矛盾呢？Well, what happened was … that the industry went into a recession in late 1984, sales started seriously contracted, and John didn"t know what to do, and he had not a clue. And there was a leadership vacuum at the top of Apple. There were fairly strong general managers running the divisions, and I was running the Mackintosh division, somebody else was running the Apple II division etc. There were some problems with some of the divisions, and there was a person running thestorage division that was completely out of lunch. A bunch of things needed to be changed. 1984年底IT行業進入蕭條期，銷售業績大幅下降，John開始驚慌失措。這時蘋果公司正好羣龍無首，各個部門的負責人都很強勢，互不相讓。我管理Mackintosh部門，有人管理Apple II 部門，還有些部門已經瀕臨關閉，比如存儲部門，公司百廢待興。But all those problems got put into a pressure cooker, because of this contraction in the market place, and there was no leadership, and John was in a situation where the board was not happy, and where he was probably not long for the company. And one thing I did not ever see about John, until that time was, he had incredible survivalinstinct. Someone once told me "this guy didn"t get to be the this you know president of Pepsi co without these kind of instincts", and it was true. And John decided that a really good person to be the root of all the problems would be me. And so we came to loggerheads, and John had cultivated a very close relationship with the board, and they believed him, so that"s what happened. 市場疲軟又進一步激化了公司的內部矛盾。大家各自為陣。董事會對公司的業績很不滿意，John的職位岌岌可危。那時我才發現John有一種很強烈的自救本能。有人曾提醒我百事前總裁絕非善茬兒，他說得沒錯。John把一切問題都歸咎到我頭上，我們因此反目。董事會一向很信任John，所以我被掃地出門了。So there were competing visions for the company? 你們對公司的發展有不同的看法？Oh clearly … well... not so much competing visions for the company. Because I don"t think John had a vision for the company. 是，也不是，因為John根本沒有自己的看法。Well, I guess I"m asking was what was your vision at that time, lost out in sentence? 我是想問的是，你當時的願景是什麼？It wasn"t an issue of vision, it was an issue of execution. In a sense that my belief was that Apple needed much stronger leadership to sort of unite these various factions that we created with divisions. That Macintosh was the future of Apple, that we needed to ram back expensesdramatically in the Apple II area…that we needed to be spending very heavily in the Macintosh area, err... things like that. John"s vision was that he should remain the CEO of the company, and anything that would help him do that would be acceptable. 這不是願景的問題，而是執行的問題。我認為蘋果應該有一位強勢的領袖，團結各個部門。Macintosh纔是蘋果的未來，應該削減Apple II的項目開支。加大對Macintosh投資的力度。John的願景是不惜一切代價保住他的CEO位置。So you know I think that… you know Apple is in a state of paralysis in the early part of 1985, and I wasn"t at that time capable... of running the company as a whole. You know I was 30 years old. And I don"t think I had enough experiences to run a 2 billion dollar company. Unfortunately John didn"t either. And so anyway… I … I was told on certain terms that there"s no job for me, it"s really tragic. 1985年蘋果處在一種癱瘓的狀態。我那時才30歲，覺得自己沒有能力打理蘋果。我擔心自己無法管理20億資產的公司，可惜John也沒這個能力。總之他們說沒有適合我的職位了，太悲劇了。Siberia. 像是流放西伯利亞。Yeah, It would have been far more smarter for Apple to sort of let me work on the next…I volunteered why not I start research division, you know give me a few millionsbucks a year and I would go hire some really great people and we would do the next great thing. And I was told there is no opportunity to do that. 是的，他們完全可以讓我留下繼續工作。我申請過成立研發部門，每年給我幾百萬預算，網羅優秀人才幹一番大事業。他們拒絕了我的申請。Oh well. 真可惜。So my office was taken away, it was it was… I mean I will get really emotional if I keep talking about this. So anyway … but that"s irrelevant, I am just one person and the company is a lot more people than me, that"s not the most important part, the important part was the values of Apple over the next several years weresystematically destroyed. [I then asked Steve for his thoughts on the state of Apple. Remember this was 1995, a year before he would go back to Apple. Remember too when Apple bought NeXT a year after this interview, Steve immediately sold the Apple stock he received as part of the sale.] 我被趕出自己的辦公室，再聊下去我會發狂的，但這還不是最糟的，畢竟公司是大家的，不是我的。最糟糕的是蘋果的企業文化在隨後幾年裡被毀了。[接著我問Steve怎麼看蘋果的現狀] [請注意當時是1995年，是他重返蘋果的前一年] [蘋果收購NeXT之後，他馬上賣掉了到手的蘋果股票]Apple is dying today, Apple is dying a very painful death, it"s on a glide slope too, to die! And the reason is because …you know when I walked out the door of Apple, we had 10 years lead on everybody else in the industry, Macintosh was 10 years ahead. We watched Microsoft take 10 years to catch up with it. Well, the reason that they could catch up with it was because Apple stood still. I mean the Macintosh shipping today is like 25% different than the day I left! They spent hundreds of millions of dollars a year on R&D, you know total of probably 5 billion dollars on R&D. What did they get for? I don"t know! 蘋果正在衰落，非常痛苦地衰落，原因在於…我離開時，蘋果領先業界整整10年，微軟10年後才趕上我們，他們能趕上來是因為蘋果止步不前，今天的Macintosh與10年前的幾乎沒有區別，蘋果每年的研發費用數千萬，累計已經超過50億，有什麼效果？我沒看到。But it was... what happened was the ...understanding of how to move these things forward, and how to create these new products, somehow evaporated, and I think a lot of good people stuck around for a while, but there wasn"t an opportunity to get together and do this, because there wasn"t any leadership to do that, so what happens with Apple now is that they had fallen behind in many aspects certainly in market share, and most importantly theirdifferentiation has been eroded by Microsoft, and so what they have now is that they have their installed base, which is not growing, which is shrinking slowly, but would provide a good revenue stream for several years, but it"s a glide slope, it"s just gonna go like this. So it"s unfortunate and I don"t really think it"s reversible at this point of time. 他們不懂如何利用新技術，不懂如何創造新產品，優秀的員工被困在公司裏，束手無策。因為缺少有眼光的管理者，所以蘋果在各個方面都落後了，包括市場份額，產品的優勢已經被微軟趕超，現在只剩下一羣老用戶，而且數量在緩慢遞減。老用戶帶來的收益還能再撐幾年，但是逐年減少，很糟糕，而且我現在看不到挽回的希望。What about Microsoft? I mean that"s the jog not now, and it"s kind of Ford-LTD going into the future. It"s definitely not Cadillac, it"s not BMW it"s just … you know … what"s going on there, how did these guys do that? 你覺得微軟怎麼樣？它的處境有點像福特, 肯定不是凱迪拉克，也不是寶馬，他們幹得怎麼樣？Microsoft"s orbit was made possible by a Saturn 5 booster called IBM. And I know Bill would get upset with me for saying this, but of course it was true. And much to Bill and Microsoft"s credit they used that fantastic opportunity to create more opportunities for themselves. Most people don"t remember but until 1984 with the Mac, Microsoft was not in the application business, whichdominated by Lotus. And Microsoft took a big gamble, to write for the Mac. And they came out with applications that were terrible. But they kept at it and make them better. And eventually, they dominated the Macintosh application market, and then used the spring board of Windows to get into the PC market with the same applications. 微軟起家全靠了IBM。比爾聽我這麼說會很生氣，但這是事實，比爾和微軟抓住了機會，創造成了更多機會。人們忘了微軟在1984年之前根本不做應用軟體，那時是Lotus的天下。微軟確實很有膽量，冒險為Mac編寫應用程序，剛開始他們的應用程序非常糟，但他們不斷改進，最終佔領了Mac的應用市場。然後藉助Windows這塊跳板，打開了PC市場的大門。And now they dominated the application business in the PC space too. So they have 2 characteristics. I think they are very strong opportunists. And I don"t mean that in a bad way. And two, they are like the Japanese. They just keep on coming. And now, they were able to do that because of the revenue stream from the IBM deal. Butnonetheless they made the most of it and I gave them a lot of credit for that. The only problem with Microsoft is they just have no taste. They have absolutely no taste, and what that means is... I don"t mean that in a small way, I meant that in a big way in the sense that they don"t think of original ideas, and they don"t bring much culture into their products. 現在他們已經佔領了PC市場，我覺得他們有兩大優勢：首先，擅長捕捉機會。其次，像日本人一樣鍥而不捨。他們起家全靠跟IBM合作。但是他們很擅長利用機會，這一點我很佩服。微軟唯一的問題是沒品位，完全沒有品位可言，只會一味模仿，產品缺少文化和內涵，為什麼這很重要？And you say why is that important, well, proportionally spaced fonts come from typesetting and beautiful books. That"s where one gets the idea. If it weren"t for the Mac, they would have never had that in their products.And, so I guess, I"msaddened not by Microsoft"s success. I have no problem with their success. They"ve earned their success, for the most part. I have the problem with the fact that they just make really third-rate products. 比例字體的靈感來自字體設計和精美書籍，如果沒有Mac，微軟永遠不會想到這些。讓我難過的並非微軟的成功，我一點不嫉妒他們，他們的成功基本上是靠勤奮工作換來的，我難過的是他們做的是三流產品。Their products have no spirit to them. Their products have no... sort of spirit of enlightenment about them. They are very pedestrian. And the sad part is that most customers don"t have a lot of that spirit either. But the way we are going to ratch it up... our species, is to take the best, and to spread it around everybody. So that everyone grows up with better things, and start to understand the subtleties of these better things. And Microsoft is just... McDonalds. And that"s what saddens me. Not that Microsoft has won, but that Microsoft products don"t displayed more insight and morecreativity. 他們的產品沒有靈魂和魅力，太過平庸，更讓人難過的是用戶居然毫無察覺。但人活著是要追求極致，並分享給同類的，這樣人類才能共同進步，學會欣賞更美的東西。微軟不過是另一個麥當勞，這纔是我難過的原因，不是因為微軟贏了，而是因為微軟的產品缺少創意。So what are you doing about it? Tell us about NeXT. 你打算改變這種局面嗎？NeXT有什麼計劃？Well, I am not doing anything about it. 暫時沒有。Ok. 哦。Because NeXT is too small a company to do anything about that, I am just watching it, and there"s really nothing I can do about it. [Next we talked about NeXT, the company Steve was running in 1995, which Apple was soon to buy. NeXT software would become the heart of Mac in the form of OS10.] Steve: You don"t really want to hear about NeXT, do you? NeXT太小了，我只能眼睜睜看著，無能為力。[接著我們聊到Jobs正在經營的NeXT公司] [NeXT被蘋果收購後，很快成為Mac OS10的研發主力] Steve: 你大概沒興趣聽我聊NeXT吧？Yes, I do. 我想聽。You do? Okay, well... maybe the best things take so much time, I just tell you what NeXT is today. There hasn"t been … clearly theinnovation of computer industry is happening in software right now, and there hasn"t been a revolution in how we create software in a long... (sneeze) Sorry. The innovation in the industry is in software, and there hasn"t ever been a real revolution how we created software, certainly nonetheless in 20 years . As a matter of fact, it"s getting worse. 好吧。我直接說NeXT目前在做什麼吧。很顯然，計算機產業創新要靠軟體。但是長久以來，軟體開發方式沒有本質變化。對不起。軟體開發方式20年來一直沒有變化。不但沒有變化，反而越來越糟。Well, Macintosh was a revolution for the end users to make it easier to use, it was the opposite for the developer, the developer pays the price, and the software got more complicated to write, as it became easier to use for the end user, so software is impetrating everything we do these days, in businesses software is one of the most important pop competitive weapons. I mean it"s the most successful business war was MCI friends and family in the last 10 years, and what was that? It was a brilliant idea it was custom-billing software. AT&T didn"t respond for 18 months yielding millions of dollars for the market share to MCI. 降低了用戶的使用難度，這是一項創舉，但增加了程序員的工作難度，軟體開發越來越複雜。軟體正在向各行各業滲透，成為重要的商業競爭武器，MCI與AT&T十年來的競爭是就是最好的例證，MCI做了什麼？不過是率先採用客戶賬單軟體，18個月內就搶走了AT&T數百萬美元的市場份額。Not because they are stupid, but because they couldn"t get the billing software done. So in ways like that, in smaller ways, software is becoming an incredible force in this world, to provide new goods and services to people whether it"s over the Internet or what have you, software is going to be a major enabler in our society. We have taken another...one of those brilliant original ideas from Xerox PARC that I saw in 1979, but didn"t see really clearly then, called objectoriented technology, and we have perfected it and commercialized it, here and become the biggest supplier ever to the market, and this object technology let you build software 10 times faster, and it"s better. So that"s what we do, and we got a small to medium sized business, a large supplier of objects, you know we were 50 to 75 million dollar company, got about 300 people, and that"s what we do. AT&T並非毫不知情，可就是搞不定客戶賬單軟體，軟體正在釋放不可思議的力量。新的軟體產品和軟體服務將改變我們的社會，我們借鑒了施樂PARC的另一項研究成果，也是1979年看到的，當時只瞭解一點皮毛。這項研究叫面向對象編程，NeXT已經將其商業化，成為最大的供應商。它可以將軟體開發速度提高十倍，而且質量更好，這就是NeXT目前做的事。公司有300人，資產是5000~7500萬美元。And the end of the 3rd show, actually is one moment that we do look into the future, because channel 4 has asked us to do that. So what"s your vision of 10 years from now, with this technology that you are developing? 第四頻道要求三期節目結束前請嘉賓展望一下未來。你怎麼看未來10年的技術發展趨勢？You know I think the internet and the web…there are two exciting things happening in software and in computing, one is objects, and the other is the web, the web is incredibly exciting because it fulfilled a lot of our dreams, that the computer would ultimately not primarily a device for computation butmetamorphosis a device for communication, and with the web that"s finally happening, Secondly it"s exciting because the Microsoft doesn"t know it, and therefore it"s tremendous amount of innovation happening. 我看好互聯網和web。軟體行業正在發生兩件激動人心的事，一個是面向對象編程，另一個就是web。web將實現我們盼望已久的夢想，計算機不再僅僅充當計算工具，開始承擔通信功能。可喜的是微軟還沒發現這一點，創新的機會很多。So I think the web is going to be profound in what it does to our society. As you know 15% of the goods and services in the US were sold by catalog over TV. All that would go on the web and more, billions and billions …soon tens of billions of dollars of goods and services are going to be sold on the web. A way to think about it is ultimately directed customer distribution channel, and another way to think about it is the smallest company in the world can look as large as the largest company in the world on the web. web將深刻改變我們的社會，你知道美國有15%的商品是通過電視購物銷售的，電視購物很快會被web取代，網路銷售的潛力巨大，網路將成為最直接的銷售渠道，而且在網路上小公司與大公司看起來沒有區別。So I guess... I think the web, if we look back 10 years back now. The web is going to be a defining technology a defining social moment for computing. I think it"s going to be huge and I think it brews a whole new generation of life into personal computing, I think it"s going to be huge. 如果將來回顧計算機發展歷史，web技術必然成為重要的里程碑，它的潛力很大，會吸引更多年輕人進入計算機行業。And you are making software that …你們正在開發…Of course, so is everybody, I mean forget about what we are doing, as an industry, the web is going to open a whole new door to this industry.不僅是我們，Web為IT行業開啟了新的大門。It"s another one of those things that it"s obvious once it happens, but 5 years ago, who would have guessed? 放在5年之前，誰能想像得到呢？That"s right. Isn"t this a wonderful place we are in. 沒錯，多麼奇妙的行業呀！[I was keen to know about Steve"s passion, what drove him?] [我很想知道Steve的工作熱情來自哪裡？] [是什麼在激勵他？]I read an article when I was very young, in the Scientific American, and it measures the efficiency of locomotion for various species on the planet. So for you know for bear, Chimpanzee, raccoons and birds, and fish, how manycalories per kilometer they spend to move, and humans was measured too, the condor won, it was the most efficient, and the mankind, the crowned creation, came in with rather unimpressive showing about 3rd way down the list, but somebody there had thebrilliance to test a human riding a bicycle, blew away the condor, all the way off the charts, and I remember this really had an impact on me. I really remember this - humans were tool builders, and we build tools that can dramatically amplify our human abilities. 我小時候讀過《科學美國人》雜誌的一篇文章，雜誌比較了地球上不同物種的移動效率，比如熊、猩猩、浣熊、鳥類、魚類等，計算它們每移動一公里消耗的熱量，還有人類，最後禿鷲贏了，它的移動效率最高，作為萬物之靈的人類，排在倒數第幾位。但是雜誌特地測量了人類騎自行車的效率，結果把禿鷲遠遠甩在了身後，在排名上遙遙領先。這篇文章給我留下了深刻的印象，人類擅長發明工具，工具夠賦予我們奇妙的能力。To me, we actually went an ad line earlier with Apple, that the personal computer was the bicycle of mind, and I believe that with every bone in my body, that of all the inventions of humans, the computer is going to rank near, if not at the top, as history unfolds if we look back, and it is the most awesome tool that we ever invented, and I feel incredibly lucky to be at exactly the right place in silicon valley, at exactly the right time, historically where this invention has taken form. As you know when you set vector off in space, if you can change direction a little bit at the beginning, it"sdramatic when it gets few miles on space, and I feel we are still really at the beginning of that vector, and if we can nudge it into right directions, it would be a much better thing as progresses on. And I look, you know we had the chance to do that a few times, and it brings all of us associated with tremendous satisfaction. 蘋果以前有一條廣告：計算機是思想的自行車。我堅信如果將來回顧人類歷史，計算機將是人類最偉大的發明之一。我覺得自己非常幸運，在矽谷參與這項發明。這就好比畫幾何向量，開始時失之毫釐，結果會謬以千里。我們剛剛起步，只要找對方向，以後就會非常順利。我們已經嘗試了幾次，結果讓人非常滿意。And how do you know what"s the right direction? 你怎麼知道哪個方向是正確的？You know ultimately it comes down to taste, it comes down to taste, it comes down to trying to expose yourself to the best things that humans have done, and try to bring these things in to what you are doing. Picasso had a saying "good artists copy, great artists steal", we have always been shameless about stealing great ideas, and I think part of what made the Macintosh great was that people working on it were musicians, and poets and artists, andzoologists and historians, who also happened to be the best computer scientists in the world. But if it hadn"t been computer science, these people would have all been doing amazing things in other fields, and they all brought with them, we all brought to this effort a very liberal arts sort of air, a very liberal arts attitude that we want to pull in the best that we saw in other fields into this field, and I don"t think you"ll get that if you are very narrow. 最終得由你的品味來決定。你要熟悉人類在各種領域的優秀成果。嘗試把它們運用到你的工作裏。畢加索說過：拙工抄，巧匠盜。我從來不覺得借鑒別人的創意可恥，Macintosh團隊裏有音樂家，有詩人、藝術家、動物學家、歷史學家，這些人也懂計算機，所以Macintosh才這麼出色，如果沒有計算機，他們也會在其他領域造創奇蹟。大家各自貢獻自己的專業知識。Macintosh因此吸收了各個領域的優秀成果，否則的話，它很可能是一款非常狹隘的產品。One of the questions I asked everyone in the series was are you a hippie or a nerd? 最後我問了一個規定問題：你是嬉皮士，還是書獃子？Oh if I had to pick one out of these two, I am clearly the hippie, all the people I work with were clearly that category too. 如果必須二選一的話，我肯定是嬉皮士，我所有的同事都屬於嬉皮士。Really? 真的嗎？Yeah. 是的。Why? You seek out hippies? They are attracting to you? 為什麼？你有意招聘嬉皮士嗎？他們吸引你？Well, ask yourself what"s hippie? I mean this word has a lot of connotations, but to me, remember the 60"s happens in the early 70"s, we have to remember that, that"s sort when I came of age, so I saw a lot of these, and a lot of things happened in our backyard here. So to me the spark of that was that there was something beyond, sort of what you see every day, there are something going on here in life beyond just a job, a family, 2 cars in the garage and a career. 你覺得什麼是嬉皮士？不同的人有不同的理解，但是對我來說…60~70年代的嬉皮士運動給我留下了深刻印象。有些活動就是在我家後院舉行的，嬉皮士運動啟發了我，有些東西是超越日常忙碌瑣碎的生活的。生活不僅僅是工作、家庭、財產、職業。There"s something more going on, there"s another side of the coin, that we don"t talk about much. and we experience when there are gaps, when we kind of aren"t... when everything is not ordered or perfect and when there"s a kind of gap, you experience this inrush of something, and a lot of people have set off to find out what that was, you know whether it"s the road or the Indian mystics, whatever it might be, and the hippie movement got a little bit like that, they want to find out what that was about, and life wasn"t about what they saw their parents doing, and of course the pendulum swung too far the other way, that was too crazy. but there was a germ of something there, and it"s the same thing that causes people to want to be poets instead of bankers, and I think that"s a wonderful thing. And I think that same spirit can be put into products, and these products can bemanufactured and given to people, they can sense that spirit. 它更豐富，就像硬幣還有另一面。雖然大家嘴上不說，但在生活的間隙，尤其是在不如意的時候，我們都能感受到某種衝動，許多人想找回生活的意義，有人去流浪，有人在印度神祕儀式裏尋找答案，嬉皮士運動大概就是這樣，他們想尋找生活的真相。生活不應該是父母過的那樣，當然，後來運動變得太極端了。但是他們的出發點是可貴的，正是因為這種精神，有人寧願當詩人也不願做銀行家，我很欣賞這種精神，我想把這種精神溶入產品裏，只要用戶使用產品，就能感受到這種精神。If you talk to the people who use the Macintosh, they love it, you don"t hear people loving products very often, you know, really, but you can feel it in there, there were something really wonderful there, So I don"t think that most of those really best people that I had worked with, had worked with computers for the sake of working with computers, they work with computers because they are the medium that is best capable oftransmitting some feelings that you have. You want to share with other people, does that make any sense to you? Macintosh的用戶真心喜歡我們的產品，在此之前，你很少聽人說真心喜歡商業產品，但你可以從Macintosh感受到某種奇妙的東西，我覺得優秀的同事都不是為了計算機而工作，而是因為計算機是傳達某種情感的最佳媒介。他們渴望分享，你理解嗎？Oh yeah. 當然。And before they invented these things all of these people would have done other things, but computers were invented and they did come along, all these people did get interested in school or before school, and say "hey this is the medium that I think I can really say something in". 如果沒有計算機，我們可能會從事其他行業。是計算機讓我們這些從小接觸它的人走到了一起。計算機就是我傳達情感的媒介。In 1996, a year after this interview, Steve Jobs sold NeXT to Apple. He then took control of his old company at a time when it was 90 days from bankruptcy, what followed was a corporate renaissance unparalleled in American business history, withinnovative products like iMac, iPod, iTunes, iPhone, iPad and Apple Stores, Jobs turned an almost bankrupt Apple into the most valuable company in America. As he said in this interview, he took the best and spread it around "so that everybody grows up with better things". 採訪結束一年後（1996年），Steve將NeXT出售給蘋果。在蘋果即將破產之際，喬布斯重新掌管了公司。隨後展開了美國商業史上絕無僅有的拯救行動，隨著iMac、iPod、iTunes、iPhone、iPad、Apple Store等創新產品的陸續推出，喬布斯將一家瀕臨破產的企業改造成全美最有價值的公司。正如他在採訪中所言，他追求極致，分享給同類，這樣人類才能共同進步。聲明：音視頻均來自互聯網鏈接，僅供學習使用。本網站自身不存儲、控制、修改被鏈接的內容。"滬江英語"高度重視知識產權保護。當如發現本網站發布的信息包含有侵犯其著作權的鏈接內容時，請聯繫我們，我們將依法採取措施移除相關內容或屏蔽相關鏈接。
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