聯合國承認巴勒斯坦之法理分析
鑒於很多人對於巴勒斯坦合法性的疑問，筆者轉載並翻譯一篇權威分析文章供大家參考。
轉載自 U.N. Recognition of a Palestinian State: A Legal Analysis
Original Artical: U.N. Recognition of a Palestinian State: A Legal Analysis
In order to address this question appropriately, it is first necessary to correct the common misconception that the United Nations established the State of Israel. On November 29, 1947, the U.N. General Assembly only approved the partition plan that would replace the British Mandate over the land of Israel. The decision of the U.N. General Assembly was binding in that case because of the special status of Palestine as a territory under British Mandate, a system which was intended to prepare nations for independence. This regime no longer applies to Palestine. Similarly, it is important to emphasize that the U.N. General Assembly did not "establish" the State of Israel in 1947. The General Assembly actually approved Israels full membership in the United Nations only in May 1949, almost a year after the Israeli Declaration of Independence. As a rule, the General Assembly of the UN cannot establish a state; rather, it can express its support for the establishment of a state and accept the state into its ranks (if the U.N. Security Council agrees), or it can call upon its member states to recognize the new state and to support its admission to the ranks of other international organizations.
想要更確切地闡釋這個問題，首先我們需要澄清一個誤區，即國聯在1947年12月29日「建立」了以色列。聯合國大會僅通過了關於將英統巴勒斯坦地區移交給以色列的地區劃分規劃。聯合國大會的決議（被認為）與這件事相關（以色列建國）主要是因為巴勒斯坦在英統巴勒斯坦地區的特殊性，因為這塊區域被用於準備建設獨立國家。這項政策並不適用於巴勒斯坦。同樣的，我們也需要強調一點，聯合國大會並沒有在1947年「建立」以色列國。大會實際上在1949年5月才通過了以色列的正式成員身份，將近在以色列獨立的一年後。從規則上講，聯合國大會並不能建立一個國家；更應該說，聯合國大會表達了它對建立一個國家的支持（如果聯合國安理會同意的話），或者說，它（聯合國大會）可以動議它的成員國來承認這個建立的國家（以色列）在國際組織上的地位。
When, then, is a political entity recognized as a state under international law? The classic definition of the existence of a state is found in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933. Article 1 of this Convention defines a "state" as a political entity that has the following four qualifications: a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The Convention also stipulated that the existence of a state is not dependent on the recognition of the state by other states. It thus appears that in this Convention, which reflects international custom, the opinion that the existence of a state is dependent upon its recognition by other states was rejected; recognition by other states is merely a statement of an established fact.
那麼，在什麼情況下一個政治實體才會被國際法承認為一個國家呢？對於這個問題，在1933年的《蒙特維多國家權利義務公約》是經典的解釋。該公約的條款一中定義了作為「國家」的政治實體應該有以下四個標準：
- 有常住人口
- 有確定的領土
- 有政府
- 有能力與其他國家建立關係
同時《公約》還規定，國家的存在不依賴於其他國家對（待定）國家的承認。因此從這個公約的內容來看，它拒絕了「依賴其他國家承認才能確立國家存在」的觀點，這也反映了國際上的慣例；其他國家的承認僅僅是一個既定事實的陳述。
According to the 1933 definition, U.N. recognition of the Palestinian state has no legal significance whatsoever; rather, the question of a States existence depends upon its meeting a series of conditions in reality. This is certainly the case with respect to the first three conditions set forth in the Convention: population, territory, and government. Regarding the last condition—the ability to conduct foreign relations—the accepted interpretation of this condition is that it was intended to prevent a situation in which units that are operating within the framework of a federal regime or that are subject to any kind of agreement that prevents them from conducting foreign relations, would be recognized as independent states. In other words, in this case as well, the question is one of fact. As Yoram Dinstein defines it so aptly in his book International Law and the State (Hebrew, 1971), the real question is: Is the political entity independent in its domestic policy, in making decisions regarding foreign affairs, and in its ability to function in the international arena?
根據1933年《公約》的定義，聯合國對於「巴勒斯坦國」的承認沒有任何法律效應；此外，對於一個國家是否成立的問題，我們更應考察其是否滿足一系列的條件。《公約》的（條款一中的）前三個條件確實是：常主人口，領土和政府。然而考慮到最後一個條件——建立外交關係的能力——對於這個條件公認的解釋是：防止一個單位在聯邦制國家內獨立運行的情況發生（譯者註：因為聯邦制國家內的城邦符合《公約》前三條的內容卻不能認為是獨立的國家）或者防止這個單位受到任何形式的妨礙他們進行對外關係的協議的約束（譯者註：如受到制裁的國家，雖滿足前三個條件，但與大多數其他國家不能建立正常外交關係，仍被認定為獨立國家）。換言之，對於這個例子（以色列和巴勒斯坦的主權問題），問題就是事實。正如約蘭·丁斯坦（Yoram Dinstein）在他的著作「國際法和國家」中所定義的那樣，真正的問題是：這個政治實體是否在國內政策，外交決策以及在國際舞台上的作用方面獨立？
The question of whether a Palestinian state exists, as a question of fact, is the subject of disagreement. On one hand, in the Gaza Strip, there is at least a regime that theoretically meets the conditions of the Montevideo Convention and appears to be essentially independent. As stated, the question of the lack of recognition of the regimes legitimacy by other states, is not relevant according to the Montevideo Convention. It is likely that the Palestinian Authority, at least in Area A (the areas in which the Palestinian Authority has full responsibility for internal security, public order, and civil affairs), also meets the aforementioned conditions of independence. Obviously, however, these two political entities—Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in Area A—are not declaring independence separately, mainly because the Palestinians are interested in international recognition of a "theoretical" third state that may not meet the criteria of the Montevideo Convention: a united and independent Palestinian state in all of the areas of Mandatory Palestine that Israel conquered in the Six Day War (i.e., the areas outside the 1967 borders), including East Jerusalem and the areas in which there are Jewish settlements. The existence of such a theoretical state is highly doubtful according to the definitions of the Montevideo Convention. The government in the area in question is divided between three political bodies that each claim the right to control it—Israel, Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, the body that is actually seeking recognition—the Palestinian Authority—is subject to the Oslo Accords, which explicitly stipulated that this body is not independent and that its actual control of the area and ability to enter into relations with other states are not absolute, but rather subject to various limitations. Furthermore, the issues of the location of the borders and the size of the population of the Palestinian state are at the center of a controversy that has been the subject of negotiations that have been conducted between Israel and the Palestinians for years. It is likely that if the Palestinians leave the definition of the borders unclear (as did the State of Israel at the time of its establishment), or if they reduce the area of their state to a minimum, their chances of meeting the definition would improve. However, the Palestinians are not interested in fragmented pieces of territory, with separate states on each piece, apparently because they fear that Israel will present those borders as final and fixed.
作為一個事實問題，是否存在「巴勒斯坦國」這個問題是分歧的主要矛盾。一方面，在加沙地帶，至少有一個政治實體符合《公約》的條件，從而似乎基本上是獨立的。如上所述，缺乏其他國家對其合法性的廣泛認同與《公約》不相關。因此，至少在區域A（巴勒斯坦民族權力機構對該區域的內部安全、公眾秩序和公民權利完全負責，譯者註：區域A截至2013年指約旦河西岸13%的地區，系以色列公民禁止進入的區域），巴勒斯坦民族權力機構符合前面所提的國家獨立的條件。然而，很顯然的在加沙的「哈馬斯」和在區域A的巴勒斯坦民族權力機構並沒有各自宣布獨立，主要是因為巴勒斯坦人想要國際承認一個事實上不符合《公約》的獨立且統一的「第三國」：即在「六日戰爭」時以色列佔領的所有的「巴勒斯坦地區」上的地區（如，1967年邊界外的地區。譯者註：國際上稱之為「綠線」，即巴勒斯坦人想要宣布獨立的地區是綠線外的地區，而這些地區並不符合《公約》的規定）。在這個問題中，這些區域的政府被分成了三個政治實體，他們分別都宣稱對此地擁有控制權——以色列，哈馬斯，巴勒斯坦民族權力機構。而事實上尋求國際認同的政治實體——巴勒斯坦民族權力機構——反對「奧斯陸協定」，該協定明確規定，這個政治實體不是獨立的，它對地區的實際控制和與其他國家的關係的能力不是絕對的，而是受到各種限制。
此外，「巴勒斯坦國」的邊界地點和人口規模問題是多年來以色列和巴勒斯坦人之間進行談判的爭議的中心。如果巴勒斯坦人模糊邊界的定義（就像以色列成立時那樣），或者如果他們把國家的面積減少到最低限度，他們很可能會達到《公約》定義的（獨立建國）標準。但是，巴勒斯坦人對各自為政的領土不感興趣，顯然是因為他們擔心以色列將這些邊界作為最後和固定的邊界。
This classic analysis, however, does not fully deal with the complexity of the subject of recognition of a state as it has developed in recent years: In the years since the signing of the Montevideo Convention, especially at the end of the colonial era, and even more so in recent years, the question of recognition has returned to the forefront of international discourse. On one hand, political entities that did not receive international recognition did not receive the status of states, even if they fulfilled the conditions of the Montevideo Convention. Examples of this are northern Cyprus, which is considered to be territory occupied by Turkey and is not recognized as an independent state, and Taiwan, which is still considered to be part of China. On the other hand, political entities that never met the conditions of the Montevideo Convention were recognized by the states of the world, and are considered to be states. This is the case, for example, with the Democratic Republic of Congo, which did not have an effective government at the end of Belgian colonial rule, or Bosnia, which was engaged in a civil war at the time of its establishment.
然而，這一經典分析並沒有完全解決近年來「承認（國家合法性）」這個問題的複雜性：《公約》簽署以來的，特別是在殖民地時代末期，近年來更是如此，「承認（國家合法性）」的問題重新回到了國際論壇的前沿。一方面，沒有得到國際承認的政治實體即使符合《公約》的條件，也沒有得到（合法）國家的地位。這方面的例子如北塞普勒斯，其被認為是土耳其佔領的領土，不被認為是獨立的國家；台灣（雖然符合《公約》所有標準）也被認為是中國的一部分。另一方面，從未滿足《公約》條件的政治實體有的也得到了世界各國的承認，被認為是（合法）國家。例如，剛果民主共和國在比利時殖民統治結束時並沒有一個有效的政府；或者是在成立時參與內戰的波斯尼亞。
What, then, is the role of international recognition and how does it figure into the case of the Palestinian state?
那麼，國際認同對「巴勒斯坦國」有什麼作用？它又是如何影響這一事例的呢？
It seems that in recent years it is slowly becoming apparent that international recognition is especially important when there is doubt as to whether a political entity meets the conditions of the Montevideo Convention. In such a case, recognition by other states can resolve the doubt and attest to a states existence. A clear example of this process is the states that were established in the wake of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Croatia, for example, was not completely independent of Serbian rule at the time that it claimed independence. Recognition of Croatia by the states of the European Union, which was accompanied by a great number of conditions, contributed in actual fact to the consolidation of international recognition of an independent Croatia, resolving doubt or controversy regarding the existence of this state. Kosovo exists as an independent state due to the protection provided by a multinational force on its territory, a fact that casts doubt on whether Kosovo meets the criterion that requires effective control of the territory. Nonetheless, broad international recognition of Kosovos independence continues to grow.
近年來似乎慢慢顯而易見的是，如果對一個政治實體是否符合「蒙得維的亞公約」的條件有疑問，國際承認就顯得尤為重要。在這種情況下，其他國家的承認可以解決疑問，並證明一個國家的存在。這個過程的一個明顯的例子是在前南斯拉夫解體之後建立的國家。例如，克羅埃西亞在宣稱獨立時並不完全獨立於塞爾維亞統治。歐洲聯盟各國對克羅埃西亞的承認，伴隨著許多條件，實際上有助於鞏固對獨立的克羅埃西亞的國際承認，解決對這個國家存在的疑慮或爭議。由於多國部隊在其領土上提供的保護，科索沃作為一個獨立的國家而存在，這一事實使人懷疑科索沃是否符合需要有效控制領土的標準。儘管如此，國際上對科索沃獨立的廣泛認可仍在繼續。
From this discussion, it is apparent that in modern international law, when there is controversy regarding whether a political entity meets the factual conditions of statehood, international recognition of the state is significant. Such recognition cannot create a state ex nihilo, but it can tip the scales when facts are disputed. What is international recognition based upon? Certainly such recognition is based upon political considerations, but it also rests on the right of a nation to self-determination and the degree of the future states commitment to the principles of the international community. The length of time the political entity has existed is also important for the recognition of a state when there is controversy regarding its existence. Since the long term existence of a non-state political entity does not contribute to the stability of international rule, states tend to recognize entities that have been operating independently over time as states.
從這個討論中可以看出，在現代國際法中，當一個政治實體是否符合國家的實際條件存在爭議時，國家對國家的承認是有意義的。 這種承認不能創造一個「無中生有」的國家，但是在事實有爭議時，這種承認可能會達到規模。 國際認可是基於什麼？ 這樣的承認當然是基於政治考慮的，但也取決於一個民族的自決權和未來國家對國際社會原則的承諾程度。 政治實體存在的時間長短對於國家在存在爭議時也是重要的。 由於非國家政治實體的長期存在並不有助於國際統治的穩定，因此國家傾向於承認長期以來作為國家獨立運作的實體。
Can an affirmative vote in the U.N. General Assembly reflect international recognition to the Palestinian state? As stated, a General Assembly vote does not, in and of itself, constitute a legal act of the U.N. which is binding upon member states, and the U.N. General Assembly does not have the authority to admit a state to the U.N. unless the U.N. Security Council (in which the United States has a veto) has recommended accepting the state. At most, the General Assembly can upgrade the status of the Palestinian representation to the level of an observer state, similar to the status of the Vatican, or can call upon other international organizations to accept the Palestinian state.
聯合國大會的贊成票能否反映國際上對巴勒斯坦國的承認？ 如上所述，大會表決本身並不構成對成員國有約束力的聯合國法律行為，聯合國大會無權接受聯合國的一個國家，除非聯合國安理會 （其中美國有否決權）建議接受國家。 大會最多可以將巴勒斯坦代表的地位提升到類似梵蒂岡地位的觀察員國的地位，或者可以要求其他國際組織接受巴勒斯坦國。
Nonetheless, the vote of the U.N. General Assembly has a certain degree of legal significance: It can attest to the recognition of the Palestinian state by states of the world. As stated, in a case in which the existence of the state, as a matter of fact, is partial, and there is no consensus regarding it, such recognition may be significant. In my opinion, the necessary condition for such recognition to be significant is that it is general recognition; in other words, that there is an overwhelming majority in favor of recognition, which goes beyond "the automatic majority," and that there is so much recognition that is it possible to argue that (almost) all the countries in the world recognize the Palestinian entity as a state. Only in such a case can it be said that international recognition can move the discourse in international law from normative questions (e.g., should a Palestinian state be established and what should its territory be?) to positive questions (e.g., what are the rights of the existing Palestinian state and what should Israel do in response to the establishment of such a state?).
然而，聯合國大會的表決具有一定的法律意義：它可以證明世界各國對巴勒斯坦國的承認。如上所述，在國家的存在是事實上是局部的，而對此沒有共識的情況下，這種承認可能是重要的。在我看來，這種認可的重要性的必要條件是普遍承認，換句話說，絕大多數贊成承認是超越「自動多數」的承認，而且有這麼多的認識，有可能認為世界上（幾乎）所有的國家都承認巴勒斯坦人實體作為一個國家。只有在這種情況下，才能說國際承認可以將國際法中的話語從規範性問題（例如，如果一個巴勒斯坦國建立起來，它的領土應該是什麼？）轉到積極的問題上（例如，什麼是現有的巴勒斯坦國以及以色列應該如何應對建立這樣的國家？）。
Israels current policy, which is intended to garner opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state or at least lack of support for the establishment of such a state, seeks to achieve precisely this objective: The prevention of general international recognition of the present positive existence of the Palestinian state, and especially to prevent recognition of the 1967 borders as the permanent borders of the state. General international recognition of these borders is likely to put Israel in a very complex situation, since it would seemingly be controlling territories of that potential Palestinian state.
以色列目前的政策是為了反對建立一個巴勒斯坦國家，或者至少不支持建立這樣的國家，力求實現這個目標：防止國際上普遍承認目前的存在的巴勒斯坦國，特別是防止國際承認1967年邊界為（巴勒斯坦國）國家永久邊界。 國際上對這些邊界的普遍承認可能使以色列處於一個非常複雜的局面，因為它似乎是控制這個潛在的巴勒斯坦國的領土。
From a strictly legal point of view, it is likely that the State of Israel will prevail in the current round: It is possible that general international recognition of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders will not receive the necessary majority, or that the U.N. decision will be vague enough to enable the State of Israel to regard it merely as a declaratory decision. But without real and significant negotiations, it is reasonable to assume that in the future, an international majority will be attained that will express general international recognition of the Palestinian position, even with respect to the issue of permanent borders—a situation that it is preferable for Israel to avoid.
從嚴格的法律角度來看，以色列國很可能在目前這一輪戰勝：巴勒斯坦國在1967年邊界內建國的普遍承認可能不會獲得必要的多數贊同，或者聯合國的決定將會含糊不清，使以色列只能把它看作一個宣示性決定。 但是，如果沒有真正的重大談判，即使在永久邊界問題上，也可以認為今後將獲得國際上的多數認同，以表示對巴勒斯坦立場的普遍的國際承認，這種情況是以色列將要極力避免發生的。
這篇文章是一篇小心翼翼的「政治正確」論述文，但我們不妨理解和分析其中提到的一些要點。「國際認同」就是一個國家「合法建國」的標準嗎？顯然不是的，甚至聯合國大會對於某些國家的「認同」都不具有法律效應。而《蒙特維多國家權利義務公約》中第一款第4條中關於「外交能力」的模糊闡述也讓「國際認同」的法律效益存疑。
顯然，如果我們從事實上出發，不難得出結論：巴勒斯坦人主張的，以1967年邊境線為基礎的「巴勒斯坦國」，即使在國際上看，也是不存在法律效力的。但是國際上對於未明確邊界的「巴勒斯坦國」的普遍承認卻有十分重大的國際影響力。國際認同對於「巴勒斯坦國」的影響力主要表現在對巴勒斯坦人獨立建國的支持，並非承認哈馬斯或者巴勒斯坦民族權力機構對於「巴勒斯坦國」的領土和邊界的定義。
另外，目前的「國際認同」對於「巴勒斯坦國」的地位也僅是暫時的、階段性的。然而目前這種「模糊的國際認同」對於巴勒斯坦建國是存在消極影響的，因為這種「國際認同」沒有明確巴勒斯坦的邊界和如何建國的問題。積極的「國際認同」應該推動以巴雙方對於邊界問題的定義，以及建國方式的確認。因此，這個問題的最終解決，需要依靠以色列和巴勒斯坦雙方協商。
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