（個人渣翻譯，如有不當請多包涵，文章立場與本人無關，最後一段妥妥打臉了

LONDON – While I was Governor of Hong Kong,from 1992 until the handover of the city to China in 1997, I kept a diary.Consulting that diary over the last few months, as I write a book partly aboutmy experience there, I have discovered several passages describing China』s「struggle」 school of diplomacy – one that endures even today, as we approachthe 20th anniversary of Hong Kong』s return to Chinese sovereignty.

倫敦——當我的港督任期自1992年到1997年香港主權移交於中國為止，我一直在做著日記。前幾個月，為了寫一本關於我的港督經歷的書，我又翻了翻那本日記。在裡面，我找到了幾篇描述中國「鬥爭外交」的文章。這種外交鬥爭甚至一直持續到今天，即便現在香港回歸中國已經過去20年了。

In China』s struggle school of diplomacy, nodecision could be confirmed without a protracted argument with ChineseCommunist Party (CCP) officials. That argument ended only when it became clearthat the Chinese could squeeze no other concessions out of those on the otherside of the table. Time, Chinese negotiators seemed (or pretended) to believe,was on their side, so they could always wait out their opponents.

中國的外交鬥爭中，在沒有與中共官員的長期爭論的情況下，任何決定都是無法確認的。只有當中國人作為談判對手無須做出任何讓步的情況明晰之時，爭論方可結束。中國談判者似乎（或假裝）相信，時間在他們一邊，所以他們可以拖垮他們的對手。

It was often difficult to see the point ofthe whole miserable exercise. Why, for example, push up the price of a newairport for Hong Kong by delaying its construction? I suppose the Chineseauthorities preferred that the project be completed when China, not the UnitedKingdom, was responsible for the city.

常常很難明白一些令人困惑的事情究竟是為了什麼。例如，為什麼延遲建造香港新機場，使得建造成本不斷提高呢？我想，中國當局寧願由中國——而不是英國管理這個城市的時候來完成這個項目吧。

Another example of this bullying approachconcerned the arrangements for the handover itself. China made a number ofproposals that, had we not resisted them, would have allowed its army to sweepinto Hong Kong well before June 30, 1997, the agreed handover date.

這種侮辱我們的方法的另一例子與主權交接有關。中國提出了一些建議。如果我們不抵制的話，就可以讓他們軍隊在達成協議的交接日期——即一九九七年六月三十日——之前進入香港。

The Chinese also pushed hard to make thehandover ceremony itself a humiliation for Britain. They wanted the Prince ofWales, the principal British representative at the ceremony, to pay court toChina』s president (though they did not demand that he bow before handing overthe keys to the city).

中國人也努力地讓交接儀式成為英國的恥辱。他們要求威爾士親王在儀式上作為英國的首席代表，諂媚於中國國家主席（雖然他們沒有要求親王在將移交香港主權之前向主席鞠躬）。

Here, too, we held firm, eventuallyagreeing that China』s president and the Prince of Wales would enter a room at thesame time. The president made a short formal speech, to which the prince andBritish Prime Minister Tony Blair offered impromptu responses. With a flurry ofhandshakes, everyone departed and that was that. It was not the kind ofceremony that should have taken such pains to plan, particularly given that theChinese had nothing substantial to say; yet, as was so often the case, it wasthe product of a struggle.

這種情況下，我們堅定不移，沒有同意中國人的無理要求。最後達成一致：中國主席和威爾士親王同時進入大廳。主席發表簡短的正式演講，威爾士親王與布萊爾首相給出了即時的回應。在一陣握手之後，每個人旋即離開，就是這樣。這不是那種應該如此煞費苦心計劃的「儀式」——特別是在這種場合，中國無需做出什麼實質性的表態；不過正如同以往發生過的類似事情一樣，這仍然是「鬥爭」的產物。

Chinese negotiators』 obstreperousness mightbe somewhat palatable if the agreements that resulted were ironclad. Butcontrary to the perceptions of many – including those to whom I have spokenabout China』s struggle diplomacy – evidence suggests that Chinese authoritiesdo not necessarily keep their word.

如果我們與中國人所達成的一系列共識最終產生了令人啼笑皆非的結果的話，那中國談判者的極不可靠也能說得過去。與許多人的看法相反——這看法包括那些我曾經談到過的，涉及到中國「鬥爭外交」的看法，表明中國當局不一定信守自己的承諾。

Consider China』s accession to the WorldTrade Organization. During the negotiations, in which I was involved, Chinapromised to open its market to the rest of the world. But it has done so onlyslowly – far more slowly than other countries opened their doors to Chineseexports and investment. More broadly, the CCP connived to create a slopingplaying field – just ask any foreign chamber of commerce in Beijing.

這讓我想到中國的加入世貿組織的進程。在這場我也參與了的談判中，中國承諾將對世界各國開放她的市場。然而事實證明，這個進程是極為緩慢的——而且遠遠小於其他國家的市場對中國的出口產品與投資的開放程度。而且，中共有意要營造一個失衡的市場競爭環境——只要問問在北京的外國商會成員就可以得出答案。

It probably seems hypocritical for aWestern politician to criticize emerging powers for untrustworthiness, at atime when the president of the United States – once the leader of the West – isthe shockingly undependable Donald Trump. With moves like withdrawing the USfrom the Paris climate agreement, Trump has shown that he can be trusted nofurther than he can be thrown.

然而，現在的事態似乎表明，西方政客們對這個新興強國的批評是很虛偽的。尤其在曾經的西方世界的領導——美國——的總統，居然是相當不可靠的唐納德·特朗普的時候。通過退出巴黎氣候協定的一系列行為，特朗普已經告訴我們——他是完全不可信任的。

But that will change, when Trump, sooner orlater, is swept into the ashbin of history. The same cannot be said for thePolitburo Standing Committee – the CCP』s top leadership body – which outlastsany one leader. As China becomes an increasingly important player in globalaffairs, the rest of the world would do well to recognize the possibility ofunreliability, or even deception, by its leaders.

不過，這種狀況也會發生改變，因為特朗普遲早會被掃入歷史的垃圾堆裏去。然而，相同的結論，卻無法相同地應驗在比任何領導人的影響力都持久的中共中央政治局常委們的身上。在中國愈發扮演全球事務中重要角色的當下，世界的其他國家將會更好地認識到其領導人不可靠，甚至採用欺騙手段的可能性。

An important test of China』s reliabilitywill play out in the next few years in Hong Kong. The shift in sovereignty fromBritain to China was based on the 「joint declaration」 between the two countriesconcluded in the mid-1980s. This document, an international treaty lodged withthe United Nations, guaranteed that Hong Kong』s autonomy and way of life wouldbe safeguarded for 50 years, or until 2047.

一個對中國可信度的重要考驗將在若干年後的香港身上發生。中英兩國的主權移交基於八十年代中期的聯合聲明。這份向聯合國提交的國際條約，確保了香港的自主與生活方式將被保障五十年，直到2047年。

So far, things are not going quite asplanned. Despite having largely respected the agreement during the first fewyears after the handover – though it rather quickly started dismantling thearrangements for ensuring democratic accountability – China』s grip on Hong Konghas tightened considerably.

迄今為止，事情並沒有像規劃中那樣開展下去。儘管在交接後的頭幾年裡，中方儘管在很大程度上尊重了協議——雖然他們很快就開始取消了確保民主責任制的一系列安排——但顯而易見的是，中國對香港的控制已大大收緊。

Indeed, far from implementing democraticreforms, China has threatened the rule of law, the independence of thejudiciary, and the autonomy of Hong Kong』s universities. It has also madenot-so-subtle attempts to curtail freedom of the press. Hong Kong residentshave been abducted and taken across the border to face the 「rule of law」 on theCCP』s terms.

事實上，不但中國當局遠沒有實行所承諾的民主改革，它甚至已威脅到了香港的法治、司法獨立與大學的自治。中國當局也已經採取並不巧妙的方式來限制新聞自由。香港居民甚至被中共以「法治」的名義綁架出邊界。

The CCP seems to think that after 20 years,the outside world won』t care what happens in the former British colony. Thepeople of Hong Kong, meanwhile, increasingly have to wonder whether China willrespect their city』s rights – or squeeze its windpipe.

中共似乎認為，二十年之後，外界不會在乎在一個不列顛的前殖民地發生了什麼事情。然而，香港人民卻愈發擔憂中國到底會不會尊重他們城市的權利——亦或是要扼住這座城市的咽喉。

To be sure, HongKong remains one of the freest cities in Asia, not least because of the prideits residents take in their status as Hong Kong Chinese. They are patriots, whobelieve not in Communist authoritarianism, but in pluralism and the closeconnection between personal freedom and prosperity.

可以肯定的是，香港仍然是亞洲最自由的城市之一，這不僅僅因為香港居民以香港華人這一身份為榮。他們是愛國者——他們不相信共產主義者治下的威權主義，他們信仰的是多元主義和個人自由與繁榮之間的緊密聯繫。

President XiJinping would do well to take the opportunity offered by the handover』s 20-yearanniversary to reaffirm China』s commitment to the joint declaration – and thento follow through on that affirmation. As for the rest of the world, we shouldwatch closely what happens in Hong Kong. If China』s leaders break their word inHong Kong, how can we trust them in other areas?

習主席將會抓住香港主權移交二十週年這一契機，重申中國對聯合聲明的承諾，並且再加以確認。對於其他國家而言，我們要緊密觀察香港的動態。因為——如果中國的領導人失信於香港，那我們又如何在其他領域之中相信他們呢？

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