今天不分析；今天，我們反服貿！
近日台灣的社群和媒體說了很多關於服貿的角度和議題，讓我們看看大陸那邊怎麼看服貿和其他的經濟交流，我用關鍵字「不放一顆子彈」「買下台灣」在Google上搜尋，找到許多驚人的文章，附上連結並節錄部分內容。關鍵的內容應該是出自於2014年2月19號，Dr. Parris Chang (張旭成，前國安會副秘書長及立法委員，現任賓州州立大學政治系榮譽教授及台灣政經戰略研究基金會董事長)的一篇文章：Beijing’s strategy to ‘buy’ Taiwan.（北京「買下」台灣的策略，全文與連結附在文後）之後又有多篇文章引用其中一部分的概念，發表在兩岸三地的論壇。內容提到「在經濟上，大陸試圖通過服貿協定（對港的CEPA及對台的ECFA）推動兩岸融合。從香港的經歷看，協定將為大陸情報人員在台灣生活和工作提供合法掩護，便利他們積聚資源，影響和左右台灣的政治進程和政策，朝不放一槍的和平統一前進。」「北京意欲拉攏多個國民黨與民進黨的重量級政治人物。前者包括準備參選台北市長的連戰兒子連勝文，後者也有民進黨前主席謝長廷，以至該黨2012年總統參選人蔡英文。（北京）也試圖影響今年5月民進黨黨主席選舉」。
或許支持服貿的人會認為Dr. Parris Chang的論點是假說，僅是個人觀點不具代表性，是為了打擊國民黨候選人而血的，甚至是為了推廣台獨而提出的謬論。但是，就我所知政府目前並未實際說明如何避免這樣的事情發生，只有說：「不會啦！」「不會這樣啦！」「不會那樣啦！」
我相信任何決定都有風險和效益，也不否認服貿通過可能有其效益，但我擔心的不是「沒有效益」、而是「風險太高」！「開放」的方式有很多種，服貿只是其中一種，而這種方式目前看來，風險過高、效益不明，明智的作方應當是放棄服貿，另謀開放。
台灣人民其實沒有那麼喜歡為反對而反對，若不是被逼到退無可退，多數人寧願逛街上網，喝茶聊天。今天如果服貿真的像政府說的那麼美好，有需要像張公慶忠用這樣卑劣粗糙的手法強渡關山嗎？
結論一：兩岸的經濟開放絕非單純的經濟活動，尤其是大陸對台灣，更多的是軍事、情報和戰略的成分，對大陸而言，「買」下台灣是共產主義戰勝民主主義的象徵。
結論二：高度且合理懷疑政商團體蒙住馬英九的眼睛，一手收下中共推過來的現金，一手把台灣推向大陸。
結論三：開放的方式有很多種，反服貿不代表反開放，反服貿只是代表我們需要安全的開放、需要尊重的開放！
http://www.sanjun.com/luntan/20140225/21483.html
发布时间：2014-02-25 17:19 文章来源：未知
「大陆方面希望在马英九在任时启动对话，打造将台湾锁入“一个中国”笼子的不可逆、不可变框架，这样一来，即便2016年民进党重新上台也不能废除。在经济上，大陆试图通过服贸协定推动两岸融合。从北京的观点看，这个协定意在发挥一种至关重要的政治和统战作用。......从香港的经历看，协定将为大陆情报人员在台湾生活和工作提供合法掩护，便利他们积聚资源，影响和左右台湾的政治进程和政策，朝不放一枪的和平统一前进。......连胜文拥有强大背景，在正式宣布参选(台北市长)前就在民调中领先。他是前台湾“副总统”连战之子，而连战是台湾方面同北京对话的主要人物，受到北京信任。为了让连胜文更容易胜选，北京还试图影响民进党以及其他反对派阵营的候选人。......与此同时，北京在同民进党高层发展关系。前民进党主席谢长廷是去年访问大陆的最重量级民进党人物，北京据称也寻求年“总统”竞选人蔡英文访问。为发挥更大影响力，北京也试图影响今年5月民进党党主席选举。」
「由2003年實施CEPA至今，無疑是拉攏了不少香港富豪或各式愛港組織分子，不時替中共在港搖旗吶喊，但不少本港知識分子及中產人士對中共的疑慮，則惟恐日甚一日。」
美媒：北京或不发一枪“买下”台湾 2014-02-21 02:57环球时报
Beijing’s strategy to ‘buy’ Taiwan: Coerced unification without firing a shot February 19th, 2014 | Posted by WorldTribune.com
It is no secret that Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou anxiously seeks to attend the APEC summit in Beijing in October and facilitate a historic meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, hoping to extricate himself from deep political woes at home and salvage his presidency.
For this reason, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Minister Wang Yu-chi made a special trip to Nanjing to meet with China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun from Feb 11-15. They met briefly last October at the previous APEC meeting, but this time was to be their first substantive talk on the development of cross-strait relations between the officials in charge of Taiwan-China affairs.
The international media devoted considerable attention to the event closely watching whether the Nanjing dialogue would become a preliminary meeting to prepare for a future Ma-Xi summit.
Although cross-strait ties have improved dramatically, the two sides are still far apart on sovereignty and other key political issues, hence Director Zhang told Minister Wang that time is not yet right for Xi to meet Ma at the APEC.
However, Beijing’s response leave room for an about-face if certain demands are met and hinted that the “right” conditions must exist before Ma’s trip. Knowing fully well Ma’s helplessness, Xi could seize the opportunity to extract huge political concessions from Ma the supplicant. What Xi wants most is Ma’s firm pledge to begin cross-strait political dialogue soon.
The dialogue on cross-strait political ties — concerning Taiwan’s future political status and international participation, confidence-building measures and a peace agreement — would be extremely complicated and time-consuming. People in Taiwan, and the U.S. as well, are unlikely to allow Ma to deliver Taiwan to China.
On the other hand, Xi seeks to set the train in motion while Ma is in office and create an irreversible, irrevocable framework to lock Taiwan into the “one China” cage that could not be undone even if the DPP were to return to power in 2016.
Beijing is exerting immense pressure on the Ma regime toward more cross-strait political dialogue that will lead to a peace agreement. Ma so far has put forth a formula of “economics first, politics later” to restrict cross-strait interaction to economic relations. Displaying Beijing’s impatience with Ma’s stonewalling against cross-strait political dialogue, Xi reportedly told Ma’s special envoy to the APEC summit last October: “The issue must step by step reach a final resolution and it cannot be passed on from generation to generation.”
In economics, Beijing sought to advance cross-strait integration with a cross-strait service trade agreement.
From Beijing’s perspective, this agreement is intended also to perform vital political and united front functions in Taiwan. As shown by the experience of Hong Kong, the agreement will provide legal cover for China’s agents to live and work throughout Taiwan. Through Chinese enterprises and shops, China’s operatives would continue to build up its resources, and strengthen its capability to influence and shape Taiwan’s political process and policy efforts toward peaceful unification without firing a shot.
With the seven-in-one elections to be held in November this year and the presidential and legislative elections in 2016, many KMT leaders — and Beijing — are apprehensive that voters could reject KMT candidates in November and vote the KMT government out of office in 2016. Beijing has much at stake and is looking for ways to cope with a weakened Ma administration.
Most significantly, Beijing is attempting to hand-pick a candidate to run for the mayor’s office in Taipei.
Sean Lien has formidable credentials: He seems quite popular in Taipei and enjoys the support of the pro-China media, leading the polls even before officially having announced his candidacy. Lien comes from a wealthy and well-connected family and is the son of former vice president and former KMT chairman Lien Chan, who, as Beijing’s principal interlocutor in Taiwan, enjoys Beijing’s confidence and has met several times with Xi.
Moreover, Xi has also met Sean Lien and appears to be fond of him, joking about his height during a meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. As mayor of Taiwan’s capital, Lien would provide Beijing not just a direct link to the KMT leadership, but also a strategic power base to counterbalance Ma and post-Ma leaders, and to affect Taiwan’s cross-strait policy as well. Thus this is a race for more than the mayoralty of Taipei.
To facilitate Lien’s electoral victory, Beijing tries also to manipulate the selection of the mayoral candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the broader opposition camp. Beijing and pro-China media appear to have endorsed Ko Wen-je, a well-known physician and an independent candidate who leads most opinion polls, but has been accused of soliciting Beijing’s support during trips to China and of being Beijing’s “Manchurian candidate”.
At the same time, Beijing has cultivated links with the higher echelons of the DPP. Former premier and DPP chairman Frank Hsieh was the most prominent DPP figure to visit China last year and Beijing has reportedly also sought a visit from former DPP chairperson and 2012 presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen. To exert greater influence over the DPP, Beijing also seeks to influence the election of its party chairman in May.
Former Chinese president Hu Jintao is said to have confided to his inner circles that it is both easier and less expensive to “buy” than to militarily conquer Taiwan. Hence Beijing has been steadily acting on this logic through economic means and a wily united front operation to make inroads into corporate Taiwan, the ruling and opposition parties’ media, and at the grassroots level to enhance Beijing’s outreach and control over the nation in order to bring about unification.
Beijing has eschewed the threat of force and placed greater emphasis on other means of influence to avoid possible military confrontation with the U.S., which has maintained a protective security relationship with Taiwan as mandated by its Taiwan Relations Act.